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Foreword
As we write this foreword, the world is facing the worst economic crisis since the Great
Depression, tied to the COVID-19 pandemic. The number of extremely poor and undernourished
has increased dramatically. Millions of workers and small-scale entrepreneurs have lost their
jobs and livelihoods, with women and youth hit particularly hard. Beyond triggering a recession,
COVID-19 has shone a light on the deep vulnerabilities inherent in our global economic and
food systems.
As countries worldwide plan for a post-pandemic recovery, we have an opportunity to design
more equitable and inclusive systems. This will require concerted efforts from both public and
private actors that are fully aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals in order to foster
inclusive growth that is environmentally and socially sustainable.
Responsible investment in the agri-food sector holds strong potential to support realization
of the SDGs. Such investment can help address some of the world’s most pressing challenges,
including the achievement of sustainable food security, protection and regeneration of vital
ecosystems, and the creation of decent work and livelihood opportunities for those who
need them most. Mechanisms that promote responsible investment in agriculture and food
systems are thus critical to addressing the systemic vulnerabilities and inefficiencies COVID-19
has exposed. Such mechanisms include targeted, well-designed incentives for sustainable
investment, with a particular focus on small-scale producers and small- and medium-scale
enterprises.
This guide, which is a joint product of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations and the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, makes an important contribution
in this regard. It provides policymakers and government technical staff with guidance on
whether and, if so, how investment incentives can be used to enhance investment that is
aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Committee on World Food Security
Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems.
The guide contains analytical frameworks, recommendations and good practices that can
inspire new approaches to investment incentives. It builds on the extensive experience and
expertise of both organizations on the trends, impacts, multidimensional challenges, and
opportunities of agricultural investment in developing and emerging economies.
We hope that this guide will be of use to policy makers and technical staff in promoting and
supporting the responsible investment in agriculture and food systems that is critical for more
inclusive and sustainable food systems and economies.

Marcela Villarreal, PhD Director

Lisa Sachs

Partnerships and UN Collaboration Division
Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations

Director
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
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Executive summary
Increased investment in agriculture and food systems—from both the private and public
sectors—is critical to enhance food security and nutrition, reduce poverty, and adapt to climate
change. To generate sustainable benefits, this investment must be responsible.
What role should investment incentives play in encouraging such investment? This guide
helps to answer that question. Specifically, the guide provides policymakers and government
technical staff with guidance on how investment incentives can be used (and how they should
not be used) to enhance responsible investment in agriculture and food systems.
The guide provides an overview of responsible investment in agriculture and food systems;
examines common types of incentives; offers general considerations on how incentives can be
used; and discusses how to plan for, design, monitor, and evaluate investment incentives for
responsible investment in agriculture and food systems.

Responsible investment in agriculture and food systems
The Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (CFS RAI) provide a
framework for understanding responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. Such an
investment contributes to sustainable development, enhances food security and nutrition, and
respects human rights. The achievement of these objectives is supported by the incorporation
of responsible investment principles into law and policy design by governments. It is also
contingent on the incorporation of responsible investment principles into investor practices.
Inclusive and meaningful multi-stakeholder engagement should be incorporated, by both
government and investors, at all relevant stages.
Some of the principles within the CFS RAI reflect binding international human rights law,
while others embody more aspirational development goals. Incentives are often not the
most appropriate tool for ensuring that investments do not result in human rights abuses. By
contrast, some important goals in the CFS RAI focus on achieving outcomes that are critical
from a sustainability perspective, and which are aligned with but go beyond what is required by
international law. In these instances, incentives are more likely to be an appropriate mechanism—
as one tool among many—to encourage investments that help advance such goals.

Understanding Investment Incentives
An “investment incentive” is a targeted measure provided by a government to or for the benefit
of an investor (including small-scale producers) for a new or expanded investment with the goal
of influencing the size, location, impact, behaviour, sector, or other character of such investment.
Investment incentives can be broadly categorised into five groups:
• Financial incentives: Non-tax-based financial supports.
• Technical or business support incentives: Can include facilitation services, technological
packages, research and development, and extension services.
• Fiscal incentives (tax incentives): Tax-based measures.
vii
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• Regulatory incentives: Derogations from national or sub-national regulations or favourable
regulatory terms offered to investors.
• Other incentives: Measures that are categorised as incentives for the purposes of this guide
but that do not fit into the existing established categories listed above.
The guide examines common types of incentives used in the agricultural and food systems context
that fall within those categories. It provides general guidance on those incentives that are inefficient
or carry an excessive risk of negative externalities (red), those that have the potential to be good or
bad policy tools depending on how they are used (amber), and those that may be more likely to have
positive investment outcomes if used well, albeit still with risks of negative externalities (green).
The types of incentives examined are:
Financial

Technical and
Business Support

Fiscal

Other

Grants / cash /
imput subsidies

Technological
packages

Profit-based

Derogations from
domestic laws and
regulations

Loans / credit

Research and
development, and
extension and
targeted support
services

Reduced rates on
dividends and interest
paid abroad

Special land
New, targeted
tenure protections infrastructure
for large-scale
investors

Loans guarantees

Facilitation services:
Work permits,
immigration,
residence, licence
acquisition

Tax holidays

Market price
support

Reduced corporate
income tax rates

Income support

Cost-based

Concessional
insurance

Zero-ratings and VAT
exemptions
Investment tax credits
Zero or reduced tariffs
Tax deductions
Loss carry forwards
Investment allowances
Export tax exemptions
Accelerated depreciation

viii

Regulatory

Public
procurement

Overview of the guide
This guide aims to provide policymakers and government technical staff with guidance on how
investment incentives can be used (and how they should not be used) to enhance responsible
investment in agriculture and food systems.
The guide identifies key policy challenges associated with investment incentives, and offers
guidance on how to design, implement, monitor, and evaluate investment incentives that are
aligned with national development priorities and that contribute to the realisation of the 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda. By focusing on the full ambit of investors—domestic and
foreign, small-, mid- and large-scale—the guide provides a unique contribution regarding the
use of incentives for responsible investment.
The guide covers the following:
• Part I explains what responsible investment in agriculture and food systems is and who the
key stakeholders are, as a starting point for understanding how incentives may be used in
this context.
• Part II provides an overview of investment incentives and discusses some of the most
common types of incentives used.
• Part III offers general considerations on how incentives can be used—as well as how they
should not be used—to improve the quality and quantity of responsible investment in
agriculture and food systems.
• Part IV discusses how to plan for, design, monitor, and evaluate investment incentives for
responsible investment in agriculture and food systems.
• Separate annexes offer more specific guidance:
- Annex I provides more detail on theories of change and how they can be used for
monitoring and evaluating incentives.
- Annex II discusses specific challenges of tax incentives, as well as principles that should
guide the design of tax incentives.
- Annex III offers additional guidance on monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) in
the context of incentives.
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Part I – Responsible
investment in agriculture
and food systems
The agricultural sector suffers and has suffered from serious underinvestment from both the
private and public sectors. Increased investment in agriculture and food systems is critical to
enhance food security and nutrition, reduce poverty, and adapt to climate change. In order to
generate sustainable benefits, however, it is crucial to ensure not only that more investments
are made, but that more responsible investments are made.
Beyond the essential public investment that governments make in the agricultural sector,
governments also play an important role in facilitating and supporting investment by smallscale producers and other private sector investors in agriculture and food systems. Strategic
policy interventions, such as targeted investment incentives, can help to steer investors to invest
more and in a responsible manner, with a view to promoting sustainable development and
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, incentives may be ineffective,
and even detrimental, if certain fundamentals are not in place. These fundamentals include
factors such as strong institutions, reliable infrastructure, and laws that protect human rights
and the environment.
This guide discusses the circumstances in which different types of investment incentives can be
used to help to stimulate private investments that are responsible and aligned with national
development priorities.

What is responsible investment in agriculture and food systems?
Investment is the commitment of capital (whether financial, physical, intellectual, or other)
to something with the expectation of accumulating additional income or benefits in the
future.
This guide focuses on investment made by the wide range of individuals and private sector
enterprises that invest in agriculture (including livestock and pastoralism), fisheries and
aquaculture, and forestry, including investments in primary agriculture as well as those in
upstream or downstream activities. Investors include both domestic and foreign investors,
ranging from small-scale producers and micro-enterprises to large-scale corporate investors.2
Global consensus on what constitutes responsible investment in agriculture and food systems
can be found in the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems
(CFS RAI), which build on and incorporate other important guidance such as the Voluntary

2 For the purposes of this guide, financial institutions are excluded from the scope of what is considered an “investor”.

2

Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure.3 According to the CFS RAI, responsible
investment in agriculture and food systems contributes to sustainable development, enhances
food security and nutrition, and respects human rights. The achievement of these objectives
is supported by the incorporation of responsible investment principles into law and policy
design by governments. It is also contingent on the incorporation of responsible investment
principles into investor practices. Inclusive and meaningful multi-stakeholder engagement
should be incorporated, by both government and investors, at all relevant stages.
The CFS RAI consist of 10 Principles and set out the roles and responsibilities of various
stakeholders in achieving investments that are responsible and in line with the principles.
Pursuant to the principles, responsible investment in agriculture and food systems achieves
the following:
• Contributes to food security and nutrition (Principle 1).
• Contributes to sustainable and inclusive economic development and the eradication of
poverty (Principle 2).
• Fosters gender equality and women’s empowerment (Principle 3).
• Engages and empowers youth (Principle 4).
• Respects tenure of land, fisheries, and forests, and access to water (Principle 5).
• Conserves and sustainably manages natural resources, increases resilience, and reduces
disaster risks (Principle 6).
• Respects cultural heritage and traditional knowledge, and supports diversity and
innovation (Principle 7).
• Promotes safe and healthy agriculture and food systems (Principle 8).
• Incorporates inclusive and transparent governance structures, processes, and grievance
mechanisms (Principle 9).
• Assesses and addresses impacts and promotes accountability (Principle 10).
These 10 principles can guide governments in their approach to investment in agriculture
and food systems, and this approach should be incorporated into countries’ national
development strategies and priorities.
The CFS RAI, which were developed and negotiated using an inclusive multi-stakeholder
process, take the form of a voluntary international instrument that does not, on its own, create
legal obligations. Some of the principles within the CFS RAI reflect binding international

3 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT)
(FAO, 2012b).
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human rights law,4 while others embody more aspirational development goals. Relevant
aspects of international human rights law include the right to food, the right to a remedy, and
free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Human rights law creates binding legal obligations
for governments, which must: respect such rights, protect rights from infringement by third
parties such as investors, and fulfil rights by taking steps to progressively realise them. In
light of these obligations, incentives are often not the most appropriate tool for ensuring
that investments do not result in human rights abuses.
By contrast, some important goals in the CFS RAI focus on achieving outcomes that are
critical from a sustainability perspective, and which are aligned with, but go beyond, what is
required by international law. These include, for example, youth empowerment, ecosystem
services, and inclusive business approaches. In these instances, incentives are more likely to
be an appropriate mechanism—as one tool among many—to encourage investments that
help advance such goals. How incentives may do so is discussed in greater detail in Parts III
and IV.

Who are the key stakeholders when it comes to responsible agricultural investment?
There are three main groups of stakeholders who have critical roles with respect to
responsible agricultural and food systems investments:5
1. National and sub-national government actors – e.g. elected or politically appointed
ministry officials; ministry technical staff; elected members of legislative bodies, as well
as legislative committee/technical staff; local officials and technical staff.6
2. Investors – e.g. domestic and foreign; small-, mid-, and large-scale; farmers and
enterprises.7
3. Community members affected by investments, and civil society.
These groups may be involved in and/or affected by investment decisions and investment
outcomes. Each group also has different investment-related interests and needs. These
differences may be more acute at a sub-group and individual level. A participatory approach
to investments and their governance—including in the design and use of incentives—can help
to balance different needs, and ideally lead to outcomes that benefit all key stakeholders.

4 Similarly, aspects of the CFS RAI also align with, or even incorporate, key safeguards found in other international instruments that arguably

have the status of soft law, such as those contained in the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT) (FAO, 2012b) and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, (2011).
5 Other relevant stakeholders include donors, which support incentives programmes and other government programmes focused on

agricultural and food systems investment, as well as home country governments, which incentivise their outward investors in various ways.
While both can play critical roles in shaping agricultural and food systems investment, including through the use of incentives, their roles are
outside the scope of this guide.
6 For the purposes of this guide, certain public financial institutions are also considered to fall within the scope of “government.” For one

example, see below case study on the Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending.
7 While private financial institutions are also investors in agriculture and food systems, they fall outside the scope of this guide.
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National and sub-national government actors
Who has a general role vis-a-vis responsible agricultural investment?
The promotion, facilitation and regulation of investment in agriculture and food systems
involves a wide range of government authorities, from the national to the local level. While
every country has its own specific approach to agricultural and food systems investment, and
agricultural policy-making more generally, it is common for multiple ministries or agencies
at the national level, as well as sub-national entities, to play a role in contributing to relevant
policy, implementing investment approval processes, and/or otherwise influencing investment
decision-making in this context.
At the national level, for example, issues that influence investments in agriculture and food
systems may potentially be covered by a number of governmental ministries and agencies. The
following table provides generalised examples of government authorities’ potential roles and
responsibilities; while the specifics will depend on the jurisdiction, the table gives an idea of
how interrelated subjects may be parcelled out to different ministries or agencies:8

8 Adapted from FAO, 2015b.
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Table 1 – Subjects relevant to agricultural and food systems investment governance
Government Identifying
priority crops
authority
and regions
for
investment

Head of
State

*

Ministry of
Agriculture,
and/or
Forests and
Food
Security

*

Ministry of
Land

Land-use
mapping
and
valuation

Establishing
criteria for
meaningful
consultation
in investment
processes

Overseeing
implementation
of criteria for
meaningful
consultation

Designing
and
granting
incentives

Negotiating
investment
contracts
with foreign
investors

Signing/
approval
of overall
investment
contracts

Conducting
inspections
of project
compliance
with labour
laws

*
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Ministry of
Environment/
Environment
al Protection
Agency

*

Ministry of
Water
Resources

Reviewing
and revising
national
investment
policies and
investment
treaties

*
*

*

*

*

*

*

Ministry of
Finance

*

*

*

*

Ministry of
Justice

*

*
*

*

*

*

*

*

Ministry of
Trade and
Investment

Ministry of
Rural
Development

Promoting
coherence
across
national and
international
obligations

*

*
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Ministry of
Health
Human
Rights
Institutions
Investment
Promotion
Agency (see
Box 1)

*

*

Ministry of
Youth (or
Youth
Employment
Agencies)
Ministry of
Gender

*

*

(those
specifically
relating to
youth)

*

(those
specifically
relating to
gender)

Legend
Blue shaded cells marked with a * indicate the areas where the relevant ministry or agency may have a role under mainstream
practice (saying nothing of the nature or adequacy of the role).
Orange shaded cells indicate where a ministry might usefully be involved but likely is not under mainstream practice.
This table has been adapted from the table in FAO, (2015b), p. 27.
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While the previous table is only an approximation, it shows how decisions that should relate
to core governmental strategies and goals are commonly spread across different ministries,
often with minimal coordination between them. Such a siloed approach to decision-making can
undermine national objectives or a government’s ability to advance responsible agricultural
and food systems investment.
Further, in the context of investment incentives, a lack of coordination between ministries can result
in overlapping or inconsistent incentives that may even function at cross-purposes (IMF et al., 2015).

Recommendation: Seek strong coordination across relevant institutions on issues
that influence investments in agriculture and food systems, and ensure that all
relevant institutions are included as needed in incentives design and implementation.
BOX 1: THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCIES
Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) are usually autonomous public agencies or governmental
agencies working under a specific ministry that focus primarily on attracting inward foreign
direct investment (FDI) into a country or sub-national region (UNCTAD, 2001; OECD, 2018a).
This focus on FDI attraction can pose risks: research has shown, for example, that increased FDI
flows may simply displace local investment rather than increase total investment (Klemm and
Van Parys, 2012). Some IPAs—along with economic development agencies—may also focus
on promoting or attracting domestic investments, and/or on other related mandates such as
innovation promotion or export promotion.
In countries that seek to increase investment in agriculture and food systems, IPAs may have an
explicit focus on promoting such investment, for example, through a dedicated department in
the IPA. Alternatively, there may be specific Agricultural Investment Promotion Agencies linked
to national or sub-national Ministries of Agriculture, with mandates that include attraction of
inward investors as well as support to domestic investors.
IPAs tend to have four main roles: “advocacy within government to seek necessary approvals
or urge the removal of obstacles to investment; image-building to promote the country as
an investment destination; investor servicing or facilitation to help solve problems faced by
existing or potential investors; and targeting or investment generation by actively seeking out
investors based on national development plans or other criteria” (OECD, 2001).
The “one-stop shop” nature of IPAs can act as a stimulating factor for investment, but only as a
complement to “critical factors such as the quality of the investment climate and the country’s
market size.” In fact, it is plausible that “[i]n countries where the investment climate is poor,
promotion can even be counterproductive” (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016).
While IPAs are sometimes considered an investment incentive in and of themselves, for the
purposes of this guide, they are viewed simply as a conduit.
7
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Government goals for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems
Most governments have national development strategies and priorities that may influence
their approach to investment in agriculture and food systems, which in turn should be aligned
with the CFS RAI. For example, a government that has prioritised youth empowerment, poverty
reduction, and climate change adaptation may focus on how responsible investment in
agriculture and food systems can support those outcomes. Articulating the government’s goals
for responsible investment is an essential step when considering whether to offer investment
incentives, as doing so enables policymakers and technical staff to select the best type of
incentive, or another policy lever if preferable, to achieve that goal.
For foreign investment, governments often hope that investments will help to advance
macroeconomic goals, such as increased revenues, job creation, technology transfer, or linkages
that support additional economic growth. While these goals are sometimes achieved, they are
not guaranteed. Governments and their citizens can be disappointed to realise, for example,
that net livelihood loss can occur if smallholders are displaced from the land underpinning
the investment (Cordes et al., 2016), that foreign corporations can use profit-shifting practices
that drain anticipated revenues (Bolwijn et al., 2018; Jansky and Palansky, 2019), that foreign
knowledge and technology may fail to “spill over” to domestic firms (Lipsey and Sjöholm,
2004), or that earnings may not fully materialise because of project unprofitability (De Groot
and Pérez Ludeña, 2014).
When it comes to domestic investment in agriculture and food systems, governments often
focus on the large proportion of citizens whose livelihoods depend on agriculture, the need to
reduce poverty and improve food security in rural areas, and the potential for agriculture and
small-scale agri-business to provide employment, including for youth or women. Governments
thus may hope that opportunities to increase investment in agriculture and agribusiness can
offer ways to improve rural livelihoods and well-being.
In addition to those primary goals, governments generally have multiple additional goals for
responsible agricultural and food systems investment. Common goals relate to issues such as:
• Supporting better health outcomes, including by improving food security at the household
and country levels.
• Achieving food self-sufficiency.
• Improving environmental impacts, from reducing negative environmental impacts of
farming to integrating regenerative practices that improve the soil and ecosystem health
of existing farmland.
• Increasing local processing and value addition.

Recommendation: Make sure that goals for agricultural and food systems
investments are grounded in national development strategies and aligned with
the CFS RAI.
8
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Agricultural and food systems investors
Who invests in agriculture and food systems?
Agricultural and food systems investment can come from the public sector, the private sector,
international donors, community-based organisations, or non-governmental organisations. It
can be domestic or foreign. It can involve investors who are small-scale individual producers
or micro/small enterprises, medium-sized producers or enterprises, and large corporations or
corporate groups. For example, investments in agricultural land can range from small plots
that measure less than 0.5 hectares in size all the way up to tracts of land in the range of
hundreds of thousands of hectares.
Research analysing the relative investments made by different types of primary agricultural
investors has found that “farmers are by far the largest investors in agriculture” (Lowder et al.,
2012). Data taken in 2012 from 76 low- and middle-income countries showed that farmers’
on-farm investments were over three times as large as all other sources of investment
combined. Specifically, in the countries analysed, domestic private farmers were responsible
for 77.5 percent of all agricultural investments, and governments for 19.5 percent (including
investment in R&D), while FDI accounted for 1.5 percent and overseas development assistance
was just shy of 1.5 percent.9 While it is possible that the relative proportions have shifted since
that research was conducted, recent data does indicate a general downward trend in FDI in
agriculture over the last five years, along with a likely outsized impact of COVID-19 on FDI
numbers (UNCTAD, 2020). Importantly, small-scale producers, both farmers and post-harvest
processers, account for a significant share of the global food consumed—up to 80 percent in
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Nwanze, 2011).
This guide focuses on private investors in agriculture and food systems, which can be broken
down into roughly the following groups:
• Domestic small-scale producers and micro and small enterprises (including, for example,
farmers, fisherfolk, and small post-harvest processors).
• Domestic mid- or large-scale producers and enterprises.
• Foreign large-scale enterprises (often taking the form of a corporation).
Given its breadth of scope, this guide does not define who is a small-, mid-, or large-scale investor (in
terms of monetary value of the investment or size of a landholding), but simply notes that there are
substantial differences between each group that need to be recognised in the policymaking context.
Notably, even within those three overarching groups, investors can be very different. This
has significant implications for policy design. For example, important distinctions within the
9 Data analysed and percentages ascribed by guide authors from Lowder et al., (2012).
10 For example, one of the rare papers focusing on mid-scale agricultural investors found in a study of recent farm size distributions changes

in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia that there were two main types of mid-scale farmer: (1) rural small-scale farmers who have expanded
(the minority), and (2) investors who have acquired their land from traditional authorities (the majority). Both groups were found to be
predominantly men, with the second group mostly middle aged and urban based with non-farm primary jobs (mostly civil service), and a
smaller subsection of that group elite rural men who acquired large landholdings at the outset of their career (Jayne et al., 2016).
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oft-overlooked mid-scale investor group exist.10 Similarly important distinctions are found with
respect to “smallholders”, a term frequently used to refer to a diverse range of small-scale
producers. For policy purposes, smallholders should be broken into more distinct sub-groups,
ranging from, at one end of the spectrum, relatively better-situated producers who can more
easily access formal markets, capital, and infrastructure through to, at the other end of the
spectrum, small-scale farm households approaching landlessness, who are often the most
marginalised and least able to benefit from government programmes (Vorley et al., 2012).
Small- and medium-scale producers’ interests and needs are also shaped by other factors, such
as gender (Box 2) and age (Box 3).

BOX 2: WOMEN AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
SYSTEMS
Women play a vitally important role in food production and are critical for achieving food
security. Women comprise around 43 percent of the agricultural labour force in low- and
middle-income countries (FAO, 2011). They are generally responsible for food crops (for the
household and sale of the excess), while men are responsible for cash crops (Villamor et al.,
2014). Because of this, women rarely benefit from land moving from food crops to cash crops.
In spite of their centrality to food systems, women often confront exclusion and discrimination
within food systems that leaves them with less access to and control over land and productive
resources, lower incomes than men, and fewer opportunities to participate in decisionmaking processes that affect them. These factors leave women more vulnerable to the risks
of investments, less likely to benefit from investments or investment incentives, and more
likely to be harmed by interventions that improve the enabling environment for investment in
agriculture and food systems.
Policymakers and technical staff designing incentives for responsible agricultural and food
systems investments should:
• Understand that women face specific barriers to investment and that women are also at
higher risk of being harmed by other investments.
• Seek to design incentives to avoid unintended negative consequences for women.
• Make women central to incentive design processes and content in order to overcome
these barriers and address these risks.
Barriers to own investment and increased risks of others’ investment
Women face specific barriers to investment. Worldwide, the productivity of women farmers is
20-30 percent less than that of men; not because they are less capable, but because they face
gender-specific obstacles. These include unequal access to productive resources, markets, and
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services, as well as additional household responsibilities due to traditional gender dynamics
(FAO, 2011). These obstacles compound and create vicious cycles. For example, obstacles to
women’s ability to buy, sell, and inherit land may force them to harvest less profitably from
communal lands, or result in their being denied access to credit.11
Women are also at higher risk of being harmed by the investment of others. As compared to men,
women’s more precarious access to land and productive resources, and their more frequent
exclusion from decision-making processes, places them at a higher risk of being negatively
affected by large-scale agricultural investments. The stronger and more secure a woman’s
rights to the land she uses, however, the more likely she is to benefit from the investments.
Gendered risks of “successful” incentives
Interventions—whether incentives, improvements to the enabling environment, or other
policy measures—that seek to increase agricultural productivity and profitability run the risk
of inadvertently harming women if care is not taken to mitigate such risks. This is because,
when interventions result in agriculture becoming more profitable and thus more likely to
yield cash at the household level, women often lose control of the land assets (to men) that
they had previously been able to use under less profitable/productive approaches. This can
occur, for example, when rural infrastructure is improved, when new extension services are
offered, and when support is provided to switch to more profitable crops. These risks should
be specifically considered and addressed when designing any incentives targeting small-scale
producers.
Women’s participation in design of incentives
When planning an intervention that may take the form of an investment incentive, policymakers
and technical staff should find ways to make women’s input central to the planning process,
including regarding the form and content of the intervention.
In terms of form and content, some objectives—such as eliminating discrimination in education
and securing women’s land rights—may be better addressed by legal and regulatory change,
or by other mechanisms that are not incentives. Other objectives—such as improving access
to extension and financial services—may very well be an appropriate target for an incentive.
To the extent that an incentive is deemed an appropriate intervention, the incentive design
phase should include participatory processes that include women who are intended
beneficiaries. Women’s participation can help identify the gendered risks that might arise from
a potential incentive, and ways to mitigate those risks. Moreover, women’s participation may
help in identifying opportunities to use incentives more proactively to remove obstacles that
women face in agriculture and food systems.

11 See Case Study: Senegal, Fonds de Garantie des Investissements Prioritaires, 34.
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BOX 3: YOUTH AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
SYSTEMS12
The value of youth in agriculture and food systems
Agricultural production systems need to produce more with less, and supply chains need to
become more resilient to systemic shocks, such as the COVID-19 induced market shock. Too
many small-scale farmers and processers still operate at subsistence or quasi-subsistence
levels, with many more facing lower incomes due to changing market situations. Youth can be
agents of change in transforming food systems and enhancing value addition, thus supporting
food security. By harnessing their innovative potential, using new technologies and techniques,
and taking advantage of new opportunities in emerging value chains, young agri-entrepreneurs
could create thriving businesses and enhance value addition of agricultural production.
In some countries, attracting and retaining youth in agriculture may be key to reducing
unemployment and distress migration. Youth are three times as likely to be unemployed as
adults, with unemployment rates stubbornly stagnating at around 14 percent globally and
reaching up to 30 percent in Northern Africa (ILO, 2020). Furthermore, youth are more likely to
be in precarious and informal employment and to experience exploitative working conditions
(UN, 2013). Burgeoning un- and underemployment in turn fuels rural-urban and international
migration, as many rural youth leave their homes in search of a better future. Recent data
suggest that 32 percent of international migrants are under the age of 30 (UN, 2015). Since
the urban sector has only limited capacities to absorb rural youth migrating to cities in
many of today’s low- and middle- countries and regions, the promotion of self-employment
in agricultural value chains, both production and post-harvest activities, remains the most
realistic employment promotion strategy governments have at their disposal, at least in the
short term.
Barriers to investment
Yet, as a joint publication from FAO, CTA, and IFAD concludes, “very few young people see a
future for themselves in agriculture” (FAO et al., 2014). As a result, current food systems are
put under significant pressure by the agricultural “generation gap”—the aging on-farm labour
force and non-rejuvenation of an entire sector. According to a recent study, the average age of
an African farmer is about 60 (FAO, 2014b; Rapsomanikis, 2015). Youth face significant barriers
that discourage or prevent them from engaging in agriculture and agribusiness. In many cases,
market failures (discussed in Part III) are key impediments. In particular, the following are
among the most frequently identified “disincentives” for youth investing in agriculture (Fiedler,
2020; FAO, et al. 2014):

12 This Box is adapted from: Fiedler, (2020).
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• Limited access to knowledge.
• Lack of financial services.
• Insecure land tenure.
• Lack of access to markets.
Other disincentives include low prices/margins and high risk due to price fluctuations, as
well as cultural aspects whereby farming is not a prestigious or attractive occupation. These
challenges are interdependent, as imperfect capital markets impede the acquisition of factors
of production. Conversely, those young people who do stay in agriculture require urgent
support to invest in technologies and techniques that will allow them to produce “more with
less”—increasing productivity sustainably.
Youth participation in design of incentives
The best way for government officials to understand the specific barriers faced by young
agri-entrepreneurs in investing in agriculture and food systems, and to develop incentives
that effectively overcome these barriers, is youth participation in policy planning and design.
Details on how and examples of participation are discussed further in Part IV.

The variation across investor groups and sub-groups results in significant differences in
agricultural and food systems investors’ goals and needs, as well as their approaches to
investment decision-making. While all sorts of investors have a role to play in advancing
responsible agricultural and food systems investment, their specific contributions, and how
they react to incentives and other policy measures, can differ dramatically.

Recommendation: Aim to design policy that is sensitive to the significant
differences that exist within investor groups, based on factors such as size, value,
role/activities, and location. Gender and age require particular attention and
sensitivity in design.
What do investors want to achieve through investment?
In spite of the vast differences in the nature of the investor, at their core, most investors
want to see the best possible returns on their investment. This is the case with the largescale corporation that owes a profit margin to its shareholders, with the domestic mid-scale
agribusiness enterprise that seeks to thrive, with the young agri-entrepreneur who wants to
make a viable income off the family’s land, and with the landless female labourer who wants
decent remuneration for the time she puts into the plot she works. Larger-scale enterprises
and foreign investors in particular might also want to achieve access to land to feed home
13
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markets, the opportunity to sell low-cost products in high value markets (again, maximising
profit margins), and good long-term relations with the community and government that can
help with branding and public perception (Smaller, 2014; Syed and Miyazako, 2013). Some
investors may also have concerns for the state of the environment, or for community and other
social relations. For some small-scale producers, including many indigenous peoples, their
relationship with the land goes much further, and their modes of production are an integral
part of their culture and way of life.

Community members and civil society
Depending on the nature of the investment, a potentially broad range of people can be affected
and so become stakeholders in a given investment decision. The size and location of the land
underpinning the investment, as well as other factors, such as environmental impact, often
influence how many people fall into that category. For example, if an investment will affect a
watercourse, people downstream are likely to be affected and so have an interest in deciding
whether and on what terms the investment should go ahead.
Individuals who stand to be affected by the agricultural and food systems investments of others
are often small-scale producers themselves. In such cases, these individuals have multiple
roles—for example, as an investor and as a community member or local land user affected by
another individual or entity’s investment.
Broadly speaking, those stakeholders who are most likely to be affected by agricultural and
food systems investments can be grouped into the following (often overlapping) categories:
• People who use or rely on land or waters where an investment is to occur (whether formal
owners or legitimate tenure rights holders).
• Local community members who own or use the land adjacent to where an investment
will occur or whose livelihoods and well-being may otherwise be affected by investment
activities.
• Producers whose own activities might feed into, or are impacted by, a larger investment
project.
• Employees or waged workers.
• Other stakeholders, in a broader sense, including citizens and consumers in the host state
and beyond, as well as advocates and civil society who are working alongside affected
stakeholders.
These stakeholders can have many legitimate interests in an investment project, including
ensuring that their rights are protected, jobs are created, the environment is not harmed, and
access to markets is improved.
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As with the other key stakeholder groups discussed above, this grouping comprises extremely
diverse stakeholders with very different—and sometimes divergent—interests and needs.
They have an important role to play in encouraging and supporting agricultural investment to
be more responsible, from input into relevant policymaking, to participation in consultation
and consent processes, through to monitoring investors or government actions. Governments
that are able to create spaces for these stakeholders’ perspectives can benefit from those
insights at multiple points: from the elaboration of relevant legal and policy frameworks, to
the determination of priorities regarding agricultural investment, through to the design of
investment incentives themselves.

Recommendation: Recognise the important roles of community members, local
landowners, and civil society in ensuring agricultural and food systems investments
are responsible, and create opportunities for them to share their perspectives
and influence decision-making.
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Part II - Understanding
investment incentives
Investment incentives are a tool that governments can use to try to influence the quality
and quantity of investment. Incentives are not the only tool that governments have at their
disposal to shape investment, and in many cases, they are the wrong tool for the job—actions
such as strengthening the content or enforcement of laws, improving physical infrastructure,
or imposing penalties might be more appropriate and effective for influencing behaviour. The
main questions of this guide are when incentives may be useful and how they can be used, as
one tool among many, to enhance responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. To
understand the potential and limitations of incentives in this context, it is necessary to first
understand investment incentives.

What are investment incentives?
An “investment incentive” is a targeted measure provided by a government to, or for the benefit
of, an investor (including small-scale producers) for a new or expanded investment with the
goal of influencing the size, location, impact, behaviour, sector, or other character of such
investment.13 In other words, incentives are:
• specific benefits (rather than general policies or measures that may influence a jurisdiction’s
or sector’s “investment attractiveness”);
• given or offered by a government (national, sub-national, or local)14 to (or for the benefit
of)15 an investor (e.g. producers, individual investors, corporations; can be domestic or
foreign);
• in the hopes of influencing the investor to behave in a certain way that differs from how
it would have behaved without the incentive (such as getting the investor to invest at all,
more, in a different region, or in a different way).
Investment incentives can be broadly categorised into five groups:
1. Financial incentives – Non-tax-based financial supports (e.g. grants, subsidies, loans).
2. Technical or business support incentives – Can include facilitation services (e.g. assistance
obtaining permits and licences), technological packages, research and development, and
extension services.
13 Adapted from Tavares-Lehmann et al., (2016), at 5; James, (2013), at 63. While there are multiple definitions of investment incentives that
have been used, this guide uses a definition that aligns with common understandings of incentives (e.g., a targeted measure, a goal of shaping
an investment outcome) and that is also broad enough to cover the range of relevant agricultural and food systems investors and investments
that are key to the CFS RAI (e.g., allowing a focus on small-scale producers rather than focusing only on foreign direct investment).
14 Occasionally, investment incentives may be offered or managed by non-governmental entities; for example, if investment promotion

agencies are private or joint public-private entities, or if a local economic development entity has been established that is not a part of
government. This guide considers all investment incentives to be provided by government, even if on occasion that provision occurs indirectly.
15 While the definition of “investment incentives” in this guide does include incentives that are given “for the benefit of” investors, this guide

focuses primarily on incentives that are offered by government directly to investors.
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3. Fiscal incentives – Tax-based measures (e.g. tax holidays, reduced income tax rates,
accelerated depreciation). For the purposes of this guide, these will be referred to as tax
incentives.
4. Regulatory incentives – Derogations from national or sub-national regulations (e.g. social,
labour, or environmental) or favourable regulatory terms offered to investors.
5. Other incentives – Measures that are categorised as incentives for the purposes of this
guide but that do not fit into the existing established categories listed above (e.g. public
procurement, and creation of new and targeted infrastructure).
Although these categories and the definition above can help in identifying and understanding
most investment incentives offered by governments, it is not always clear when a government
measure should be considered an investment incentive. For example, through public
procurement, a government may seek to purchase food (e.g. for school feeding programmes,
food aid, public hospitals, etc.) from small-scale producers in order to create a stable market
for them, even if this sometimes requires paying an above-market price. Is that public
procurement policy an investment incentive? Maybe. The government is using its purchasing
power and willingness to (potentially) pay a slightly higher price (targeted measure) to create
a stable market (benefit) for small-scale producers (investors), which can encourage increased
small-scale producer investment in the good being procured (influencing investor behaviour).
Or maybe not. The government is simply purchasing necessary goods that, even if not fully
cost competitive, provide the government value while also helping the government fulfil a
secondary objective of supporting small-scale producers. Rather than worry too much about
how to categorise those measures that could be interpreted either way, such gray areas provide
important reminders that: first, governments have many tools at their disposal, of which
incentives are only one, and, second, government measures, whether incentives or not, have
both costs and benefits that should be weighed and considered in light of policy objectives and
development goals.
Indeed, although governments use incentives to try to influence investor behaviour, incentives
are often not appropriate, not effective, or not worth their cost. For example, incentives are
not an appropriate tool to prevent serious human rights abuses, such as forced labour, which
should instead be prohibited by law. And incentives are not effective if they do not change
investors’ behaviour; this includes redundant incentives, which are provided even when the
investment would have been undertaken without the incentive.

Recommendation: Use incentives as a targeted policy instrument to address
specific needs, but only if they are effective, worth their cost, and not redundant.
One way of targeting incentives is by offering sector-specific incentives (see Box 4). In addition,
Part III provides more specific considerations for using incentives to enhance responsible
investment in agriculture and food systems.
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BOX 4: SECTOR-SPECIFIC INCENTIVES
Governments can choose to target investment incentives in different ways. For example, they
may target by way of any or all of the following:
• Investors of a particular status (e.g. first time / new entities).
• Investment of a particular monetary value.
• Investment in a particular sector.
• Investment in a particular location.
Sector-specific incentives may be more effective at achieving particular development outcomes
than generic incentives that apply in the same way to any investor regardless of sector.16 To
the extent that governments seek to use incentives to encourage both greater quantities of
and more responsible agricultural and food systems investments, sector-specific incentives—
along with other careful targeting and use of conditions (see Parts III and IV)—may be more
effective than broader incentives.
While sector-specific incentives may be more effective for achieving development goals, they
have their limitations. First, sector-specific incentives and policies can be heavily affected—
and sometimes neutralised—by economy-wide policies and other macroeconomic issues,
including exchange rate policies and industrial protection (Schiff and Valdes, 1996). Second,
sector-specific programmes have been reported to be “prone to become subject to political
pressures aimed at having their resources applied beyond original mandates,” rendering the
incentives ineffective (OECD, 2003).

What are the legal and programmatic sources of incentives?
Investment incentives are offered in many ways, but most commonly through:17
• Government programmes that are not necessarily directly prescribed in law.
• Domestic laws and regulations.
• Contracts signed between the investor and a government entity.

16 OECD, (2018b). (Noting that sector-specific incentives are on the rise in ASEAN countries as a means of achieving specific development

objectives); Christian Gonzalez, Mike Kerlin, Rachel Schaff, and Sarah Tucker-Ray, “How State and Local Governments Win at Attracting
Companies,” McKinsey &amp; Company Insights. September 13, 2019. (Noting, in the US context, that “anchoring incentives to specific sectors
enables more thoughtful investments in related areas that can also boost economic growth ….”).
17 Another legal source of investment incentives is arguably international investment agreements. IIAs are outside the scope of this guide; see

Box 5 for more information.
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Non-institutionalised programmes and initiatives
Investment incentives—particularly those targeting small-scale producers or subgroups within
them—are not always directly prescribed in law, and may instead be programme-based and
dependent on donor funding. For example, in Uganda, the FAO-Ministry of Agriculture, Animal
Industry and Fisheries Youth Inspiring Youth in Agriculture Initiative has identified youth
champions to receive small grants for their businesses. This initiative, as many other similar
programmes, depends on donor funding (Fiedler, 2020). While such initiatives do provide useful
support to young agri-entrepreneurs, reliance on funding from international organisations or
non-governmental organisations can have implications for a programme’s longevity.

Domestic and international laws and policies
Investment incentives relevant to agricultural and food systems investments can be scattered
across a number of different laws and policies, such as those specific to investment, to tax, or
to agriculture, as well as those establishing free trade zones or other special economic zones.
To the extent feasible, embedding incentives that aim to support small-scale producers into
domestic national or sub-national law can help to ensure the longevity of the programme. (See
Part IV for more on timeframe and duration.) Embedding incentives in law can also enable
more transparency, consistency, and accountability.
Beyond domestic law, incentives may also be found in—or affected by—international investment
treaties. Given that evidence demonstrates that the effect of investment treaties on decisions to
invest is indeterminate or negligible, and in light of the distinct differences between investment
treaty-making and the process of domestic investment incentives design and provision, this
guide excludes investment treaties from its coverage of incentives. It is nevertheless important
that governments understand the potential risks that investment treaties pose in the context
of investment incentives offered at the domestic or project level, as discussed briefly in Box 5.

BOX 5: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND INCENTIVES
International investment treaties, which include bilateral investment treaties and the
investment chapters of free trade agreements, provide protections to foreign investors and
corresponding obligations for state parties. These investor protections and benefits are usually
enforced through the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, by which foreign
investors (individuals and companies) can file an arbitration claim against a host country for
measures that are alleged to have negatively affected their real or expected profitability.
While proponents of investment treaties argue that the enforceable investor protections
provided by such agreements lead to greater cross-border investment flows—thus serving as
a form of investment incentive—a growing body of empirical research shows that investment
treaties do not deliver on the promise to increase investment, and that the societal costs
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associated with investment treaties may outweigh any purported benefits of new investments.
Furthermore, not all investments positively shape a host country’s development, and some
directly harm certain development objectives (Johnson et al., 2020; Johnson et al., 2018). For
these reasons, this guide excludes investment treaties from its coverage of incentives.
It is nevertheless important that governments understand the potential risks that investment
treaties pose in the context of investment incentives offered at the domestic or project level.
For example, decisions to modify or withdraw incentives from a covered investor, or offering
incentives in a discriminatory manner, may result in costly ISDS claims from investors.18
In addition, some investment agreements may limit or prohibit countries’ enforcement of
performance requirements used by a host state to advance specific development objectives.
While such risks should not prevent governments from taking the necessary policy steps to
advance specific development objectives, understanding these risks can inform government
approaches to incentives design and implementation.

Investor-state contracts
Contracts between the state (at the national or sub-national level) and a large-scale investor
are also used in some contexts to provide project-specific incentives that are agreed upon by
the parties. Investment incentive contracts generally give a package of incentives in exchange
for certain investment commitments on the part of the investor, and are used by governments
in the hopes of inducing the investor to locate in that national or sub-national jurisdiction.
In addition to specific incentive contracts, some states also enter into broader investment
contracts with investors, such as concession agreements, which also commonly include certain
incentives.19
Beyond the specific financial and tax incentives that investor-state contracts typically offer,
such contracts may also offer regulatory incentives that enable derogations from law. This
is sometimes done, for example, through a “stabilisation” provision, which aims to exempt
investors from changes in the law that may have the effect of increasing their costs of doing
business. Good practice suggests that stabilisation provisions should be avoided.
More generally, the use of investment incentive contracts presents several problems, similar
to the challenges that arise with discretionary legislated procedures discussed in Part IV.

18 As an example, numerous ISDS claims have arisen from countries’ use of local content requirements and investment incentives to encourage

investment in, and consumption of, renewable energy. Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic were forced to scale back incentives favouring
renewable energy after their unexpectedly large success led to dramatic energy market distortions. As a result of these modifications, Spain
has faced nearly 40 arbitrations from renewable energy firms, which have contested that measures altering the existing incentives regime
were in breach of investment treaties, violating their legitimate expectations and leading to the devaluation of their investments. Italy and the
Czech Republic are involved in similar claims. See, for example, Eiser v. Spain; Isolux v. Spain; Novenergia v. Spain; Cosbev, (2017); Reynoso,
(2019).
19 For examples of investor-state contracts that include investment incentives, see the range of contracts available at the Open Land Contracts
website: OpenLandContracts.org. At the time of research, a search for investor-state contracts that include income tax exemptions turned up
85 contracts from countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
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Leaving incentive provisions to individual negotiators with excessive discretion increases the
bargaining power of investors, results in complicated and costly administration and monitoring,
and increases the scope for corruption. Using investor-state contracts to offer incentives
also inherently favours large-scale investors over small-scale producers and other investors
operating at a smaller scale.20

Recommendation: Reduce or eliminate the discretion to offer incentives through
contracts and, when possible, embed incentives in domestic national or subnational law.
Common types of investment incentives
This section provides a brief overview of some of the most common types of investment
incentives used in the agricultural and food systems context: financial, technical and business
support, fiscal (tax), and regulatory. It also looks at incentives that fall into the category of
“Other” under the definition of this guide.
Each sub-category of incentives is presented below in tabular form, with descriptions of
what the incentive is and how it works, potential pros, and potential cons. The information is
presented in a “traffic light” system, where incentives that are inefficient or carry an excessive
risk of negative externalities are coded red, incentives that have the potential to be good or
bad policy tools depending on how they are used are coded amber, and incentives that, if
designed well, may be more likely to have positive investment outcomes (albeit still with risks
of negative externalities) are coded green:
Inefficient or excessive risk of negative externalities
Good or bad depending how used
More likely positive investment outcomes

Thinking about cons and costs
A number of cons and other considerations specific to each type of incentive have been set
out in the “Potential cons” column of the tables below. Beyond those specific potential cons,
however, there are a number of cross-cutting cons that may apply across the spectrum of
incentives. These cons include:
• The inherent risk that incentives may not achieve their policy objectives.
• The risk that support may not be enjoyed equally by women and men, or that women
20 Although good practice suggests that incentives should not be offered via contract, for governments that plan to continue to conclude

investor-state contracts as a vehicle for providing investment incentives, relevant resources on responsible contracts can help guide their
negotiations. See e.g. UNIDROIT et al., (2020); Smaller, (2014).
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specifically may be negatively affected, if programme design lacks gender sensitivity (see
Box 2).
• The possibility that certain incentives could run afoul of international trade laws (see
more Box 6).
• The risk that incentives may not be worth their costs.
To understand this last risk, it is necessary to understand the costs associated with incentives.
The costs of incentives include the more obvious costs, such as the actual financial outlay for
the incentive itself. For example, in the case of a tax holiday (tax incentive), this is revenue
foregone. For a grant (financial incentive), it would be the money that is being transferred to
the investor. Other direct costs include administrative costs, such as the salaries of government
officials whose time goes towards designing, administering, monitoring, and evaluating
the incentive. There are additional “hidden costs,” which include, for example: opportunity
costs (what the money might otherwise be used for), the costs of offering an incentive for an
investment that would have been made irrespective of the incentive, capital that is invested
inefficiently in order to capture the incentive, and local investment that is displaced by other
(typically foreign) investors attracted by the incentive (Thomas, 2007).

BOX 6: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES
While the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not “currently feature a credible set of
disciplines on the distortive effects of investment incentives” (Sauve and Soprana, 2016),
it is possible that certain agricultural investment incentives may be in breach of existing
international trade rules, such as, for example:21
• export-linked incentives;
• market price support; and
• input subsidies.
In addition to the actual incentives, it is possible that certain conditions attached to incentives
(discussed in Part III), such as local content requirements, could also breach WTO rules (FAO,
2013a; Sauve and Soprana, 2016; FAO et al., 2010).
Depending on how they are designed, other incentives and conditions, such as decoupled (not
linked to production) income support, income insurance and safety-net programmes, natural
disaster relief, certain environmental payments, and assistance for agricultural and rural
development, may not, however, be in breach of WTO rules (WTO, n.d.).

21 For a discussion of the WTO law applying to financial incentives applied to attract agricultural investment see Johnson et al. (forthcoming).

See also “Agriculture: Explanation – Domestic support.” World Trade Organization. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_
intro03_domestic_e.htm.

22

Recommendation: Analyse proposed investment incentives for potential
international trade law breaches.
Financial incentives
Financial incentives are direct financial advantages provided to investors. They may be either
non-reimbursable or reimbursable, with or without interest or extra costs. Common types of
financial incentives that are offered in the agricultural and food systems context and examined
in Table 2 of this guide are:
• Grants / cash / input subsidies
• Loans / credit
• Loan guarantees
• Market price support
• Income support
• Concessional insurance
Financial incentives are used for all sizes of investors. While the eligibility criteria and intended
beneficiaries are specific to the incentive (and many may be intended only for investors of a
certain size), financial incentives can offer critical support to small-scale producers, enabling
them to invest more and invest better. Financial incentives can be especially important for
those who face particular challenges in accessing financial services on the market, such as
young agri-entrepreneurs and women.
Although well-designed financial incentives can influence investment decision-making, one
commonly cited risk factor is that they can create market distortions and have other unintended
consequences. To the extent that such incentives are helping to address a market failure,
however, the accompanying “distortions” are not necessarily a problem. Due to the nuance
and complexity of this topic, market distortion is disregarded in the tables below.
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Table 2: Financial incentives
This table provides a brief overview of common financial investment incentives that may be offered to investors
in agriculture and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.
Incentive type
Grants / Cash /
Input subsidies

What it is & how it works

Direct financial transfers to investors for Enable small-scale producers
certain eligible expenses, or subsidised
to enter the market.
inputs.22 These can be provided for a
Enable small-scale producers
number of different purposes, such as:
to increase productivity or
• Inputs (e.g. for fertiliser, machinery,
otherwise remain
mechanisation).
economically viable.
• Job training (these may support
trainees, newly recruited employees,
or existing staff).
Grants and input subsidies are a
potentially powerful tool – for good
or bad, depending on what exactly is
being subsidised and the conditions
of the subsidy.

Loans / Credit

Concessional loans are provided on
more favourable terms than market
rates (e.g. lower interest rates, longer
grace periods).
Non-concessional loans or credit are
provided at market rates on the same
conditions as those offered by
commercial lenders. They are useful
when credit is not widely available; for
example, for small- and medium-scale
producers who lack a sound capital
structure or assets large enough to
guarantee loans.

Loans
Guarantees

Potential pros

Loan guarantees are a promise by
government to assume the debt
obligation of the farmer in the event
of default. They can be considered a
subsidy, and are useful in helping
encourage lending from institutions
that might not otherwise provide any
or accessible loans.

Can be effective for achieving
environmental benefits (e.g.
payments for ecosystems
services).

Potential cons
Potential limiting of benefits
to those within government
patronage networks.
Input subsidies risk:
• Environmental harm: e.g.
fertiliser subsidies can
encourage excessive use.
• Corruption and cronyism
that impact availability of
high-quality inputs for others.
• Unsustainable use of
resources.

Increased access to finance.
Enable farmers to maximise
productivity potential of their
land.

Risk of creating excessive
price subsidies that create
unfair competition with a
rising private sector.

Broad reach.
Enhance access to finance to
small-scale producers who
commonly lack access to
commercial banks, such as
young agri-entrepreneurs and
women.

Mobilise co-financing from
external sources.
Possible long-term debt
finance for development.
Enable farmers to maximise
productivity potential of their
land.

As they leverage existing
(private) financial institutions,
they only work when such
institutions exist.
Government (or other
guarantor) is exposed to risk
of principal loss.

Broad reach.
Enhance access to finance to
small-scale producers who
commonly lack access to
commercial banks, such as young
agri-entrepreneurs and women.
Market Price

A form of subsidy that guarantees

Helps farmers to not produce

Risk breach of international

23 Input subsidies can be provided in various ways. One common approach is through the use of vouchers; another is through the direct
trade rules (see Box 6).
Support
minimum prices to producers.
at a loss.

provision of the input. For these reasons, this guide has included input subsidies within this category of financial incentive. However, input
Environmental harm where it
subsidies may also take the form of a tax incentive or be offered in other ways.
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encourages unsustainable
farming practices or use of
resources.

Loans
Guarantees

Loan guarantees are a promise by
Mobilise co-financing from
government to assume the debt
external sources.
obligation of the farmer in the event
Possible
long-term
debt
Part
II - Understanding
investment
incentives
of default. They can be
considered
a
finance for development.
subsidy, and are useful in helping
Enable farmers to maximise
encourage lending from institutions
productivity potential of their
that might not otherwise provide any
land.
or accessible loans.

As they leverage existing
(private) financial institutions,
they only work when such
institutions exist.
Government (or other
guarantor) is exposed to risk
of principal loss.

Broad reach.
Enhance access to finance to
small-scale producers who
commonly lack access to
commercial banks, such as young
agri-entrepreneurs and women.
Market Price
Support

A form of subsidy that guarantees
minimum prices to producers.

Helps farmers to not produce
at a loss.

Risk breach of international
trade rules (see Box 6).
Environmental harm where it
encourages unsustainable
farming practices or use of
resources.
Consumers pay more for
product.
Reduce food industry’s
competitiveness.

Income
Support

Direct payments to farmers, e.g. on the
basis of size of land holdings (European
Commission, n.d.).

Encourage more sustainable
farming practices by providing
cash required to make
necessary investments.
Encourage the production of
more diverse and nutritious
food over more basic,
monocropped commodities.

Concessional
Insurance

Subsidised insurance. Effects may vary
depending on type of insurance and
targeting, e.g.:
• supporting farmers producing specific
crops;
• addressing specific risks (e.g. crop
yield risks, price risks, or climaterelated risks); and/or
• encouraging behavioural changes
(e.g. insurance that mitigates risks of
reduced harvests due to adoption of
more environmentally friendly practices).

Mitigate price risks.

Distort markets.

Reduce impact on farmers of
weather- and climate-related
production risks.

Encourage excessive risk
taking.

Encourage small-scale
producers to increase
production intensity.

Discourage more
environmentally sustainable
practices if such practices may
inadvertently lead to the loss
of insurance benefits.
Risk inflating value of
farmland and farming
practices, to the exclusion of
new small-scale producers.

Sources relied upon in the above table: Tavares-Lehmann et al. (2016); Teye (2019); OECD (2020); Laborde et al. (2019); IISD
(2019); Streck et al. (2012); OECD (2017); Fleckenstein et al. (2020); Riensche and Vir Jakhar (2019); Cordes et al. (2016); Vorley
et al. (2012); Locke et al. (2019).
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The following two case studies illustrate ways in which financial incentives have been used in
practice in Tunisia and Senegal.

Case Study: Tunisian Land Loans Scheme23
Like other incentives, financial incentives can be provided broadly or targeted to
specific sectors and/or beneficiaries. For countries seeking to address the particular
challenges confronting youth, financial incentives catered specifically to youth and
young adults is one available tool.
An example of a credit scheme that caters to young agri-entrepreneurs is the Tunisian
land loans scheme (prêts fonciers). Designed to support young agri-entrepreneurs
to acquire and develop land, the land loans (prêts fonciers) are a specific instrument
under the Tunisian investment code and are accessible to all youth under the age
of 40 who have graduated from university (in agriculture and related technical
fields) or have a certificate of professional competence. The land itself must have
a potential which is currently not being fully exploited. The total volume for each
loan can reach up to DT 250 000 (approx. USD 85 000), with an interest rate of 3
percent, a grace period of 7 years, and 5 percent self-financing requirement for land
acquisition, and 10 percent for land development (including electrification).
Young agri-entrepreneurs who have benefitted from the land loans are also eligible
for other, non-youth-specific investment subsidies (grants complementing private
investments), such as those that cover parts of expenses related to investments in
water-saving technologies. While the operational modalities (including eligibility
criteria) of the land loans have varied over time, this credit scheme is quite well
established, with data on the total amount of loans provided dating back to 1985.
The total volume of new prêts fonciers has increased continuously over recent years.

23 This case study is adapted from: Fiedler (2020), Box 2, 22. Citing: APIA (n.d.); FAO, (2013b); FAO and INRAT, (2020).
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Case Study: Senegal, Fonds de Garantie des Investissements Prioritaires
(FONGIP)24
Where financial institutions are accessible in rural areas, loan guarantee funds
can encourage those institutions to lend to clients who may be perceived as risky
borrowers because they lack sufficient collateral. Small-scale producers, youth, and
women often fall into this category. By supporting banks to lend to such clients,
loan guarantee funds enable those clients to invest more, thus (indirectly) serving
as investment incentives.
In Senegal, the Fonds de Garantie des Investissements Prioritaires (FONGIP, in English:
Guarantee Fund for Investments in Priority Sectors) provides loan guarantees with
specific schemes targeting youth and women. One goal is to enable self-employment
among youth (République du Sénégal, 2018). Guarantees can be provided both to
individual applicants (with an official request signed by the finance institution)
(Fongip n.d.), as well as to financial institutions for loan portfolios. Guarantees cover
loans with a duration of up to five years, with a maximum ceiling of 70 percent
of unpaid loans. FONGIP charges a commission fee of up to 1.5 percent for the
provision of the guarantee (Fiedler, 2020).

Technical and business support incentives
Technical and business support incentives, which include the provision of technical services
and helpful information, are relevant for a range of investors. To attract foreign investors, such
incentives aim to provide information, business intelligence, and technical support services
in order to overcome “information asymmetry arising from investors’ lack of familiarity with
the host economy” (Hymer, 1976). Also known as the “costs of foreignness” (Hymer, 1976), this
includes unfamiliarity with factors as disparate as the business culture and the legal system.
For FDI generally (not necessarily in agriculture and food systems specifically), such incentives
undoubtedly stimulate investment … and influence investment location patterns and related
investor behaviors (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004; Spar, 1998).
For domestic investors, including small-scale producers, technical and business support
incentives can play an important role in encouraging viable investment. Technical and business
support incentives can be particularly helpful when packaged with other types of incentives,
rendering it more likely that recipients can use those other incentives more effectively. For
instance, complementary capacity development, marketing (such as through access to fairs),
and incubation services can be key to ensuring that young agri-entrepreneurs do not only have
24 This case study is adapted from: Fiedler, (2020).
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access to financial services, but are empowered to improve the productivity and efficiency of
their businesses (Fiedler, 2020). Ideally, such support services should be “provided along the
entire value chain, delivering field-level interventions as part of more integrated programs.”
Importantly, because small-scale producers are a heterogeneous group, such services should
involve “a diverse portfolio of flexible farm-level interventions” (Gassner et al., 2019).
Technical and business support incentives can be offered pre-investment, during the course of
the investment, or after the investment has been implemented. Table 3 highlights the following
technical and business support incentives used in the agricultural and food systems context:
• Technological packages
• Research and development, and extension and targeted support services
• Facilitation services: work permits, immigration, residence, licence acquisition
Table 3: Technical and business support incentives
This table provides a brief overview of common technical and business support incentives that may be offered to
investors in agriculture and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.
Incentive type

What it is & how it works

Technological
Packages

Provision of technological packages
such as disease-resistant or other
quality seeds, composting equipment,
and particular stock breeds.
Combining provision of inputs with
training.

Training and inputs for
small-scale producers.

Support for investigations into
agricultural good practices.
Agricultural extension services may
come in the form of technical advice,
supply of inputs, information, or new
ideas developed by agricultural
research stations. These services may
focus on a range of topics, including:
improved crop varieties or livestock
breeds; better water management; and
improved control of weeds, pests, or
plant disease (Oakley and Garforth
1985). Examples of specific extension
services include agricultural colleges,
training, veterinary services,
phytosanitary services and quality
control, plant protection and health,
and engineering services. Importantly,
extension services need to be widely
available for different types of crops.

Stimulate responsible
investment, especially when
accompanied by other
carefully targeted incentives
and measures.

Research and
Development,
and Extension
and Targeted
Support
Services

Potential pros

Encourage environmentally
friendly agriculture.

Potential cons
Limited benefits, or even
harms, if inputs are not
well-suited to farmer needs
(e.g. if seeds cannot be saved
or require expensive inputs, if
livestock not well-suited for
the climate, etc.).

Improve technical efficiency.

Targeted support services may include
agri-incubators, coaching, and other
advisory services.
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Facilitation
services: Work
permits,

Investment facilitation simplifies
administrative procedures by helping
investors understand and meet

Make doing business easier.
Valued by mid- and
large-scale investors.

Where investment facilitation
measures are solely focused
on streamlining and
expediting administrative

improved crop varieties or livestock
breeds; better water management; and
improved control of weeds, pests, or
- Understanding investment incentives
plant disease (OakleyPart
and IIGarforth
1985). Examples of specific extension
services include agricultural colleges,
training, veterinary services,
phytosanitary services and quality
control, plant protection and health,
and engineering services. Importantly,
extension services need to be widely
available for different types of crops.
Targeted support services may include
agri-incubators, coaching, and other
advisory services.
Facilitation
services: Work
permits,
immigration,
residence,
licence
acquisition

Investment facilitation simplifies
administrative procedures by helping
investors understand and meet
regulatory requirements and get set up
in a country, for example, through
“one-stop shops.” This can include
support in obtaining permits and
licences from relevant government
departments, addressing immigration
issues for foreign workers, and
permitting residence of foreign
workers.
Investment facilitation that supports
responsible investment should also
include measures to generate
awareness among investors of
applicable laws, regulations, and
processes (such as impact assessment
processes), and compliance with such
rules and processes (see Box 7 below).

Make doing business easier.
Valued by mid- and
large-scale investors.
Awareness generation
functions may benefit
small-scale producers as well.

Where investment facilitation
measures are solely focused
on streamlining and
expediting administrative
requirements and procedures,
this may undermine
regulations and processes that
are necessary for promoting
investments that are
responsible (see Box 7).
Risk that permits and licenses
are provided without
sufficient screening of
investment proposals, without
sufficient due diligence on
investors, or without sufficient
engagement in investment
assessment processes, and
that preliminary permits or
licenses may be viewed as a
right to operate, even if full
set of investment approval
processes have not been
completed.
Hiring of expatriates,
especially high numbers or
unlimited, may disincentivise
local hiring and career
progression opportunities.25

Sources relied upon in the above table: Fiedler, (2020); Baliño et al., (2019); Laborde et al., (2018); Lampach et al., (2018); Ayele
et al., (2019).

BOX 7: INVESTMENT FACILITATION
Investment facilitation efforts—often, but not always, oriented around facilitating FDI—can
usefully remove undue barriers to investment, such as opaque, confusing, or burdensome
regulatory requirements, complicated or delayed administrative procedures, corruption, or
a lack of critical infrastructure or services. However, many of today’s investment facilitation
initiatives are investor-centric—focusing on speeding up approvals, removing regulatory
barriers, and stabilising the legal and regulatory environment for the benefit of investors—to
the possible detriment of other social and environmental goals. It is critically important that
facilitation initiatives not be considered in isolation from a host state’s broader development
agenda. That is to say, while governments should support an enabling environment for investors
and investments, critical factors such as environmental protection, local economic and social
development, protection of legitimate tenure rights, industrial upgrading, employment and
25 This can be addressed through hiring caps on expatriates or mandates that such workers provide training to local workforces in instances

where there is not existing capacity to carry out required tasks.
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skills training, health, climate, and other development priorities must be advanced alongside
investor-oriented policies in order to ensure that investment enhances the benefits of
development to society as a whole (Güven, 2020). Evidence also suggests that this kind of
broader framing and approach ultimately benefits the investment project itself (Coleman et
al., 2018).
Investment facilitation for sustainable development is best understood as a combination
of tools, policies, and processes, which will vary by context, that foster a regulatory and
administrative framework to facilitate investment that maximises and does not undermine
sustainable development objectives. When developing a plan to facilitate investment, a state
should holistically consider its sustainable development goals and whether there are regulatory
or technical hurdles unduly preventing it from achieving them. It should then determine the
appropriate facilitation plan that can address undue burdens for investors while remaining
aligned with broader development objectives (Güven, 2020).

The following case study illustrates ways in which technical and business support incentives
are being used in practice in Senegal.

Case Study: Modèle d’insertion des jeunes dans l’agriculture (Senegal)26
In Senegal, the Modèle d’insertion des jeunes dans l’agriculture (MIJA, in English: Model
for Youth Integration into Agriculture) programme is managed by the government’s
youth employment agency (ANPEJ) and funded by the government with support from
FAO and the Spanish Agency for Development Cooperation. The six MIJA platforms
offer comprehensive incubation services, including model farms. The programme
has successfully supported young agri-entrepreneurs to organise themselves into
the self-help association Réseau africain pour la promotion de l’entrepreneuriat
agricole (RAPEA), which in turn provides technical support services to start-up agrientrepreneurs, fosters knowledge sharing, and facilitates collective action.

Tax (Fiscal) Incentives
Tax incentives involve reductions or exemptions from ordinary taxation obligations and are
accounted for as revenue forgone or deferred. Such incentives are often preferred in particular
by lower-income countries that have fewer upfront resources for financial incentives and are
often used in the context of efforts to attract FDI (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016). Yet studies
indicate that they are often not worth their cost.
26 This case study is adapted from: Fiedler, (2020).
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Serious doubt has been cast by various econometric and interview-based studies about
the effectiveness of tax incentives as they are generally used.27 Essentially, tax incentives
cost governments a great deal in terms of lost revenue, but have not been shown to yield
commensurate benefits in terms of increased investment. This may especially be the case
for some primary production large-scale agricultural investments that could be described as
resource-seeking, such as “rubber, tobacco, sugar, bananas, pineapples, palm oil, coffee, and
tea” (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016).
Recent interview-based studies underscore the limited impact of tax incentives for commercial
agriculture in certain countries. Looking at incentives and agribusiness investment in Ethiopia,
one study found that “fiscal incentives, in particular, are non-consequential to business
Investment” (Ayele et al., 2019), with the agribusinesses interviewed identifying availability
of and access to land, infrastructure, concessional loans, and facilitation services as more
important for supporting investment. In fact, “despite substantial incentives, investments often
fail to start and meet the intended development objectives of the country” (Ayele et al., 2019).
Another study looking at agricultural commercialisation in Ghana found that tax incentives can
benefit farmers, but “they do not really stimulate investments in the agriculture sector” (Teye,
2019). In particular, decisions about investment location are not particularly influenced by tax
incentives, as poor infrastructure—which increases production costs—is a much more relevant
factor (Teye, 2019). In addition, a 2020 study of agribusiness investment and incentives in Africa
found additional evidence supporting this pattern,28 concluding that most tax incentives did
not motivate investment (with an exception for import duty exemptions), and asserting that
resources should be shifted away from tax incentives towards efforts to improve infrastructure
and increase access to finance (Ayele et al., 2020).
Tax incentives are less relevant for investors operating in the informal economy, such as many
small-scale producers. And even where smaller local agribusiness investors can technically
access tax incentives, they may not benefit from them due to their scale of operations (e.g.
they do not import large quantities of capital goods or export their produce) or due to the
administrative inaccessibility of such incentives (Ayele, 2019).
An additional challenge of tax incentives is that, even if the incentives are set up to only apply to
certain investors or investments, large-scale investors can often find ways to cheat the system
to benefit from incentives not intended for them. For example, foreign firms may set up a local
affiliate to capture incentives for domestic farmers, local firms may set up foreign entities
to capture FDI-oriented incentives, existing firms may set up new corporations to capture
benefits available only to new firms, or companies may shift taxable income to a related entity

27 For a fuller discussion on the topic, see Annex II.
28 Among other evidence provided for this assertion, the 2020 study included the results of a survey of 14 medium and large- scale agribusiness
investors (both foreign and domestic) in Ghana, Ethiopia, and Malawi, which found that only two of the 14 companies reported that fiscal
incentives had influenced their investment decisions (Ayele et al., 2020). One exception was with respect to import duty exemptions: seven
out of the nine companies who received these reported that theseexemptions “supported greater investment.” (Ayele et al., 2020). The study
also referenced previous research, including a survey focused on Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, which found that only 7.4 percent
of investors surveyed said they would not have invested without fiscal incentives (Mwachinga, 2013).
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to take advantage of certain incentives. In addition, tax incentives can also create burdensome
administration costs (IMF et al., 2015), although some are more complicated to administer
than others.
Tax incentives can be profit-based incentives or cost-based incentives. Profit-based tax incentives
reduce or eliminate the rates imposed on otherwise taxable income. Cost-based tax incentives,
by contrast, focus on expenses related to the investment and provide allowances to reduce the
cost of capital (IMF et al., 2015). To the extent that tax incentives are deemed worthwhile in a
specific context, cost-based tax incentives have a greater chance of stimulating investment,
while profit-based incentives are more likely to be redundant (see Annex II). Table 4 of this guide
examines the use of both types of tax incentives in the agricultural and food systems context:29
Profit-Based Tax Incentives
• Reduced rates on dividends and interest paid abroad
• Tax holidays
• Reduced corporate income tax rates
Cost-Based Tax Incentives
• Zero-ratings and VAT exemptions
• Investment tax credits
• Zero or reduced tariffs
• Tax deductions
• Loss carry forwards
• Investment allowances
• Export tax exemptions
• Accelerated depreciation
Table 4: Tax incentives

29 See discussion at Tavares-Lehmann et al., (2016), 24–27.
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This table provides a brief overview of common tax investment incentives that may be offered to investors in
agriculture and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.

Incentive type

What it is & how it works

Potential pros

Potential cons

Profit-Based Tax Incentives
Reduced Rates
on Dividends
and Interest
Paid Abroad

Reduces the taxes that investors,
particularly those from countries with a
worldwide taxation system, pay on
dividends and interest abroad.

Reduces or prevents double
taxation for foreign investors.

Tax Holidays

Complete exemption from paying tax
for a certain period. Frequently offered
to newly established firms. Common
practice in export-processing zones
(EPZs) and special economic zones
(SEZs).

Easy to offer, both in terms of
design and administration.

Revenue forgone.
Can be used by multinationals
to avoid taxes by shifting profits.
Creates an unlevel playing
field between domestic and
foreign investors.
Revenue forgone.
Very blunt instrument:
• Do not encourage capital
investment.
• Do not reinject revenues into
existing or new businesses.
• Do not encourage domestic
partnerships.
• Risk of firms closing
operations and reopening as
“new” ventures to re-qualify
for incentive (tax avoidance).
• Risk of tax avoidance
through transfer pricing.

Reduced
Corporate
Income Tax
Rates

Lower corporate tax rates for qualifying
investors. Extremely common.

Easy to offer, both in terms of
design and administration.

Revenue forgone.

Cost-Based Tax Incentives
Zero-Ratings
and VAT
Exemptions

Granted for inputs to reduce costs in
the agricultural process.
Granted for produce for sales of
agricultural commodities to keep the
agricultural sector out of the value
added tax (VAT).

VAT zero-rating in agriculture
aims to reduce the impact of
VAT on the poor (as the
consumer ultimately pays more
for the product with
consumption taxes) by
lowering basic agricultural
produce prices.
VAT exemptions can be
beneficial if administration of
the tax is problematic.

Revenue forgone.
VAT paid on inputs are usually
creditable against VAT
charged on sales. Therefore, in
many cases, an exemption for
VAT on inputs may have little
effect on the producer,
because they would otherwise
usually receive a full credit for
the VAT.

Increases financial viability of
projects at the margin.
Investment
Tax Credits

Permits a fixed percentage of certain
investment expenditures to be deducted
from the income tax liability. Often used
to encourage investment in R&D and
capital assets. Under a simple
investment tax credit mechanism, credits

Encourage investment in R&D.

Revenue forgone.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Risk of incentivising
unnecessary large
expenditures.
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Zero-Ratings
and VAT
Exemptions

VAT zero-rating in agriculture
Granted for inputs to reduce costs in
Revenue forgone.
aims to reduce the impact of
the agricultural process.
paid on inputs are usually
Guide on incentives for responsible investment in agriculture and foodVAT
systems
VAT on the poor (as the
Granted for produce for sales of
creditable against VAT
consumer ultimately pays more
agricultural commodities to keep the
charged on sales. Therefore, in
for the product with
agricultural sector out of the value
many cases, an exemption for
consumption taxes) by
added tax (VAT).
VAT on inputs may have little
lowering basic agricultural
effect on the producer,
produce prices.
because they would otherwise
VAT exemptions can be
usually receive a full credit for
beneficial if administration of
the VAT.
the tax is problematic.
Increases financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Investment
Tax Credits

Permits a fixed percentage of certain
investment expenditures to be deducted
from the income tax liability. Often used
to encourage investment in R&D and
capital assets. Under a simple
investment tax credit mechanism, credits
may be earned based on a fixed
percentage of qualifying investment
expenditures for that year. Other
mechanisms may be more complex, such
as credits earned for expenditures above
a certain threshold, or at different rates
depending on the level of expenditures.

Encourage investment in R&D.

Revenue forgone.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Risk of incentivising
unnecessary large
expenditures.

Zero or
Reduced
Tariffs

Import tariffs or duties on investment
project equipment or spare parts are
eliminated or reduced. This is a
common measure in export processing
zones and are particularly common in
Southeast Asia.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Revenue forgone.

Tax
Deductions

Allows investor to claim an income tax
deduction for certain investment
expenditures. The deduction goes
beyond what would normally be
allowed under general income tax rules.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Revenue forgone.

Taxable losses are permitted to be
carried forward or backward (to offset
taxable income) within a certain
timeframe.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Revenue forgone.

Allows investors to claim an upfront
additional deduction for qualifying
capital expenditures, over and above
the depreciation allowed for the asset.
As opposed to investment credits, these
provide an income tax deduction, which
offset taxable income, rather than a tax
credit, which offsets tax payable.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Revenue forgone.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Revenue forgone.

If tariffs are eliminated on
inputs that are available
locally, limits the creation of
indirect jobs.

This is a broader category that includes
other more specific types of incentives,
such as investment allowances and
accelerated depreciation, discussed
later in this table.
Loss Carry
Forwards

Investment
Allowances

Appeal to investors who expect
losses in the first years (e.g.
while penetrating markets or
ramping up production).

Can be manipulated so that
an investment project ends up
tax-free for a significant
portion of its implementation
phase.

The amount of the deduction is
generally set as a percentage of the
qualifying expenditures. As the
deduction reduces taxable income,
their value to investors depends on the
corporate tax rate applicable.
Commonly directed at R&D investment.
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Export Tax
Exemptions

Exemptions from export taxes or
excises on investment-related produce.

Can be a waste when

Allowances

additional deduction for qualifying
capital expenditures, over and above
the depreciation allowed for the asset.
As opposed to investment credits, these
provide an income tax deduction, which
offset taxable income, rather than a tax
credit, which offsets tax payable.

projects at the margin.

The amount of the deduction is
generally set as a percentage of the
qualifying expenditures. As the
deduction reduces taxable income,
their value to investors depends on the
corporate tax rate applicable.
Commonly directed at R&D investment.
Export Tax
Exemptions

Exemptions from export taxes or
excises on investment-related produce.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Revenue forgone.

Accelerated
Depreciation

Allows firms to claim depreciation
deductions on capital assets at an
accelerated rate when compared to
the asset’s useful economic life.
Incentives reflect a difference in when
tax benefits (deductions) are realised
by the firm – providing greater tax
benefits in the early years of an asset’s
useful economic life.

There is no overall difference in
tax revenue, if the time value of
money is not taken into
account.

Although there is no overall
difference in tax revenue, by
providing accelerated tax
benefits to investors, states
effectively defer the timing of
revenue collection.

Increase financial viability of
projects at the margin.

Can be a waste when
export-oriented activities end
up having limited impacts on
national economic output.

Sources relied upon in the above table: Tavares-Lehman et al., (2016); IMF et al., (2015); Perera, (2012); FAO, (2013a).

Regulatory incentives
Regulatory incentives are usually derogations from domestic laws and regulations, generally
involving a weakening of environmental, labour, or other social standards. This type of
incentive is incredibly problematic and may result in breach of international human rights law.
Regulatory incentives can also arguably include more favourable rules or regulatory regimes
that are designed to influence investor conduct, such as access to land coupled with clear land
titling and demarcation. If not done carefully, these favourable rules can also raise human
rights concerns.
Table 5 of this guide examines the following regulatory incentives:
• Derogations from domestic laws and regulations
• Special land tenure protections for large-scale investors
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Table 5: Regulatory incentives
This table provides a brief overview of regulatory investment incentives that may be offered to investors in
agriculture and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.

Incentive type

What it is & how it works

Derogations
from Domestic
Laws and
Regulations

Derogations from domestic laws and
regulations that tend to involve a weakening
of environmental, labour, or other social
standards. May be offered on a
project-specific basis, through investment laws
that give foreign investors special substantive
or procedural rights, or in free trading zones or
other special economic zones.

Special Land
Tenure
Protections for
Large-Scale
Investors

Land tenure rules govern rights to use land and
are a general factor in the enabling
environment for agricultural and food systems
investment. In countries with weak or
transitioning land governance systems: tenure
rights are often contested, legitimate tenure
rights holders may not have formalised
recognition of their rights, and government
efforts to secure tenure rights for all can be an
ongoing and lengthy process. In this context,
governments may aim to incentivise large-scale
investment by seeking to specifically protect
land rights of investors beyond general efforts
to strengthen tenure—for example, by
prioritising investment-related property for
titling and demarcation.30

Potential pros

Potential cons
Undermine human rights.
Contradict CFS RAI goals.
Little evidence of increasing
investment.

Land tenure rules are
highly relevant to
investors in the context
of agricultural and food
systems investments.
(Only focusing on
strengthening tenure
rights for investors,
however, holds
significant risks – see
Cons column.)

Prioritising tenure protections for
large-scale investors creates risks
that:
• Legitimate tenure rights claims to
the land may be ignored.
• The tenure protections provided
to the investor may be undermined
if the rights are nevertheless
contested (if legitimate rights
were ignored). This in turn, may
lead to costly conflict with local
communities, and/or costly
disputes with the investor
claiming protections under a
relevant contract or treaty.

Sources relied upon in the above table: Kelly et al., (2015); IISD, (2018); Cordes and Bulman, (2016); FAO, (2013a).

Beyond special tenure protections for investors, governments sometimes take other land-related
actions with the aim of supporting investment or investors. These include, for example:
• using the power of compulsory acquisition (eminent domain) to acquire land so that it can
be used for an investment or offered to an investor;
• offering land through land banks, where the land is identified or acquired in advance of any
specific investor, often despite extreme power differences between the government seeking
the land and the legitimate tenure rights holders who have claims to it;31
• providing large concessions with cheap rent, covering land that the government has
qualified as public or state land, even if there are conflicting claims to the land, including by
legitimate tenure rights holders whose families and communities have used and relied on
the land for generations.
Particularly in the context of weak or transitioning land governance systems, such actions are
deeply concerning. They may be in contravention of a government’s human rights obligations,
30 See e.g., Whitley et al., (2014) (noting that the Government of Zambia “provides incentives in the form of … land access via titling and

demarcation for the expansion of farm blocks as a means of expanding commercial agricultural development.”)
31 Under land governance systems with strong land rights protections and less contestation around land rights, land banks may be more
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appropriate mechanisms, and can even be used to support increased access to land for small-scale producers, including youth.

Part II - Understanding investment incentives

and can result in conflicts and severe negative outcomes. Whether such actions should be
considered “investment incentives” is debatable; for the purposes of this guide, such actions are
excluded from its scope.

Other incentives
The four categories of incentives discussed above (financial, technical and business support,
tax, and regulatory) are the most commonly recognised investment incentives. However, under
the definition of “incentive” used in this guide and in the context of responsible investment in
agriculture and food systems, there are at least two other relevant mechanisms that can be
classified as incentives. The following “other” incentives are examined in Table 6:
• Public procurement
• New, targeted infrastructure
Table 6: Other incentives
This table provides a brief overview of other investment incentives that may be offered to investors in agriculture
and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.
Incentive type
Public
Procurement

New, Targeted
Infrastructure

What it is & how it works

Potential pros

Potential cons
Might not be cost competitive.

Purchase food required for social
programmes (e.g. for hospitals,
food reserve authorities, food aid,
and school feeding programmes)
from small-scale producers,
and/or from suppliers integrating
particularly strong sustainability
practices. As noted above,
whether this is an incentive per
se may be debatable.

Create stable markets for
small-scale producers.

The creation of new, targeted
infrastructure (e.g. quality rural
and feeder roads, reliable
electricity, harbours, storage
facilities, or railways) counts as
an investment incentive if it is
related to a particular investor
or set of investors rather than
offered to all investors (even if it
may be shared by other actors).

Unlock rural agricultural
potential as it opens up areas
via roads, water control, or
markets and incentivises
increased production.

If targeting a specific investor, may divert
siting of important infrastructure from places
where new or improved infrastructure would
benefit a wider set of farmers or would
support greater economic growth.

Generate on- and off-farm
employment.

Beneficiaries of infrastructure projects are
often landowners.

Irrigation can have an
outsized positive effect on
women (who typically bear
the burden of collecting
water).

Infrastructure with a large physical footprint
(such as roads) has potential negative
impacts on biodiversity, and can be a source
of environmental degradation, and, indirectly,
greenhouse gas emissions.

Stimulate pro-poor growth
and improve rural
livelihoods.

May negatively impact tenure rights holders
who use or rely on the land needed for the
new infrastructure. This may occur if the
rights holders do not want their land to be
used for infrastructure, or if they are
displaced without sufficient due process or
adequate compensation.

Create stable markets for
investors that integrate
sustainability practices that
go beyond what is required
by law.

Improve market access.
Enhance agribusiness
investments.

Sources relied upon in the above table: Kelly et al., (2015); Tavares-Lehman et al. (2016); FAO, (2018b); Teye, (2019); IFPRI,
(2020); Jouanjean, (2013); Byiers and Rampa, (2013).
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Part III - Using incentives
to enhance responsible
investment in agriculture
and food systems: General
considerations
This Part discusses general considerations on how incentives can be used—as well as how they
should not be used—to enhance responsible agricultural and food systems investment. The
Part discusses in detail the following important considerations:
• Responsible agricultural and food systems investment is primarily determined by the
enabling environment, not investment incentives. Governments seeking to encourage
more investment should first focus on improving the enabling environment.
• Incentives tend to be more effective when they are identified as the best mechanism to
overcome a particular barrier to investment that an investor is facing, for example, to
overcome specific market failures.
• Incentives should be designed to support the outcomes encouraged by the CFS RAI,
particularly to empower small-scale producers, especially young agri-entrepreneurs and
women.
• Incentives should not disproportionately benefit large-scale foreign investors to the
detriment of other investors or other public goods towards which funds could be directed.
• Regional coordination and governance should be pursued to curb a “race to the bottom”
in offering incentives.
• Incentives may work best when offered as part of a package and/or when coupled with
other measures, such as regulatory reform or disincentives for undesirable behaviour.
• Attaching a condition or conditions to the granting of an incentive can help guarantee that
the government’s goal(s) for providing the incentive are met; this includes behavioural
goals that would improve the sustainability outcomes of the investment.
Each point is discussed further below.

38

Responsible agricultural and food systems investment is primarily determined by
the enabling environment
Responsible investment in agriculture and food systems is heavily influenced, and primarily
determined, by factors other than investment incentives. Simply put, “incentives do not work
unless certain fundamentals are in place” (Tavares-Lehmann et al. 2016).
In particular, the “enabling environment” within a country influences investment decisionmaking by large-, medium-, and small-scale investors alike. The enabling environment is the
set of factors, conditions, and safeguards that encourage investment generally, and responsible
investment specifically. Governments seeking to encourage responsible investment should,
first and foremost, focus on improving the enabling environment. This is relevant both for
promoting more investment, and for ensuring that investment is responsible.
The CFS RAI identify the following as the main elements of an enabling environment:
• Legal, regulatory, and institutional alignment with the CFS RAI and national development
strategies.
• Policy coherence and consistency.
• Effective coordination and implementation on the part of government institutions.
• Transparency, inclusiveness, and meaningful participation in the development and
implementation of relevant policies, strategies, and incentives, as well as in the context of
specific investment decision-making.
While investment incentives could be considered part of the enabling environment (CCSI and
FAO, 2019)—and while the distinction between an “incentive” and an “enabling condition” is not
always clear—they remain just one small and specific tool against a broader set of conditions
and factors that influence whether investment occurs and whether it is responsible.
These factors, inherent in the enabling environment that influence investors’ decisions about
whether to invest at all, are sometimes referred to as the “investment climate.” Many of the
factors commonly considered as comprising the investment climate (see Box 8) are more
relevant for foreign investors and large-scale domestic investors, but some are equally relevant
for small-scale producers making investment decisions. At their core, however, decisions about
agricultural and food systems investments are very context-specific, depending on the nature
of the investment itself. Investors big and small need the right environmental conditions,
decent physical infrastructure, and/or other conditions that will allow them to produce or
work profitably. Without those factors, the investment climate will be relatively unattractive
for investors who have a choice of where to invest and will be a limiting factor in the success
of small-scale producers who do not have such a choice.
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BOX 8: “INVESTMENT CLIMATE” FACTORS RELEVANT TO INVESTOR DECISIONMAKING
While investment climate factors tend to be a focus of “agribusiness”—whether domestic or
foreign—some factors will matter more to foreign firms. Other factors are equally relevant for
small-scale producers.
Macro and enabling conditions
• Political, economic, and social stability.
• Absence of conflict.
• A certain degree of institutional quality and effective coordination between government
entities.
• Decent governance.
• Information on the suitability of land available for commercial farming.
• The extent of corruption.
• Protection from unfair international competition.
More tangible investment determinants
• Access to land or other desired location-bound (natural) resources.
• Access to skilled labour.
• Decent infrastructure, especially in rural areas (e.g. feeder roads, water, electrification, rail
and port facilities, storage).
• Access and distance to major markets.
• Proximity of raw materials.
• Size of the domestic market and opportunities to do business in it.
• Access to finance with reasonable interest rates.
• Distance to the target market.
• Availability of agricultural R&D facilities.
• Reasonable interest rates and access to finance.
• The accessibility of international trade.
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Environmental Factors
• Water.
• Climate.
• Fertility and health of the soil.
• Availability of crops needed.
Laws and Institutions
• Independent legal system.
• A predictable regulatory environment (rule of law).
• A transparent and predictable taxation regime.
• Adequate property rights protection.
• Secure land tenure systems, with no community conflict.
• The existence and enforcement of contract laws.
• Enabling socioeconomic conditions.

When these elements are not present, they may act as barriers to investment. Some of these
barriers can be overcome with incentives (e.g. access to markets); others require alternative
mechanisms like legal or regulatory reform (e.g. security of land tenure); and yet others simply
cannot be changed (e.g. whether a particular crop can grow in the local environment). The
challenge for governments is in assessing which factors they can control and, of those factors,
which would be best addressed with an investment incentive.

The role of strong laws and regulation in ensuring investment is responsible
A stable legal and policy framework, bolstered by strong institutional support, is not only
important for encouraging investment (see Box 8), it can and should also be used to ensure
that investments in agriculture and food systems are responsible.
In addition to laws that regulate corporate conduct, social, labour, and environmental laws are
particularly important. As discussed in Part I, at times, efforts to incentivise investors to act or
refrain from acting in a certain way is not sufficient; laws and other regulatory requirements
are necessary to prohibit certain actions. Box 9 lists some of the areas that should be governed
by protections embedded in law rather than encouraged through investment incentives.
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BOX 9: IMPORTANT SOCIAL, LABOUR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Environmental laws
• Laws and regulations that prohibit or limit certain negative environmental impacts (water
pollution, air pollution, operations in high conservation value areas, etc.).
• Screening for environmental impacts.
• Legal requirements for ex ante and ex post environmental impact assessments for largescale projects, coupled with monitoring and enforcement (Cotula, 2016).
Social and labour laws
• Protection of tenure rights for legitimate tenure rights holders, even when land is legally
considered to be held by the state.
• Legal requirements for local consultation and free, prior, and informed consent.
• Limitations on the use of eminent domain or compulsory acquisition in the context of
agricultural and food systems investments, with clear and narrow definitions of what is
deemed to be in the “public purpose,” as well as equitable compensation requirements for
the limited situations in which land may be compulsorily acquired.
• Laws and regulations that prohibit or limit specified negative social impacts.
• Strong labour laws that protect workers’ rights, including on issues of remuneration and
health and safety, and that prohibit child labour, forced labour, and other violations of
fundamental labour rights.
• Legal requirements for ex ante and ex post human rights impact assessments for largescale projects, coupled with monitoring and enforcement.

When does it make sense to use investment incentives or when is a different
approach required?
Circumstances where incentives can help
The most obvious reason to offer an investment incentive is when it is the best mechanism
to address a key barrier that is discouraging an investor from making an investment that the
government hopes to encourage (for example, an investment that is aligned with the CFS RAI
and national development priorities).
In particular, incentives can be used to attempt to overcome market failures. For example:
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• Credit market failures can affect all sizes of investors, and particularly small-scale
producers—especially, youth and women—who commonly lack assets for collateral.
While an optimal solution would be the much bigger project of fixing the credit market,
governments can use financial incentives as a partial fix to overcome credit market failures,
influencing who can receive a loan and for what activities (Johnson et al., forthcoming).
• The market volatilities, weather fluctuations, and additional externalities characteristic of
investments in agriculture and food systems that often lead to risk aversion that affects the
investment decisions of large-, mid- and small-scale investors alike. In this case, incentives
such as matching grants, equity participation, and subsidised loans can be used to offset the
high risks which an investor is unable to insure against, encouraging investors to take on
higher risk projects that nevertheless have promising potential (Johnson et al., forthcoming).
• The failure of the market to value certain public goods and responsible business practices. The
incentive can be used to encourage conduct providing positive externalities that are otherwise
not presently valued or paid for by the market, such as environmental and social impact.
• Foreign investors may experience information asymmetries/failures due to their lack of
familiarity with a host country’s economy (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016); providing relevant
information as a technical support incentive can help overcome related challenges and
make investment in the jurisdiction more attractive.
Where the incentive is not designed to overcome a market failure that is highly relevant to an
investor, it is likely to feature low down in the list of factors upon which the investor will make
its decision, if it is even considered at all.
Beyond correcting specific market failures that might be preventing an investor from investing,
certain types of incentives also can be useful in the following circumstances:
• Supporting the development of public goods.
• Providing targeted support during economic downturns.
• Encouraging sustainable behaviours.
• Supporting, in the context of investments in agriculture and food systems, responsible and
viable investments by small-scale producers that align with the CFS RAI and the country’s
national development priorities.

Circumstances where incentives do not make sense
There are at least two critical circumstances in which incentives do not make sense for
responsible investment in agriculture and food systems.
First, an incentive should not be used when it is not the appropriate mechanism for achieving a
stated goal. Often, a government measure other than an incentive—such as a law or change in
the enabling environment—would be more effective or appropriate. For example, governments
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sometimes seek to address regional disparities by conditioning agricultural and food systems
investment incentives on investment occurring in areas that are not otherwise receiving it.
However, studies have shown that a tax break for geographical conditions is not sufficient
to stimulate investment when other more important factors, such as road infrastructure and
access to markets, are not addressed (Teye, 2019).

Recommendation: First understand the barrier that a given investor or group
of investors is facing, and then investigate whether an incentive would actually
help to overcome that barrier, or whether a different mechanism would be more
appropriate.
Second, an incentive should not be used when it is appropriate in theory but is unlikely to be
the right tool because it is poorly designed or not worth the cost. Design failure may render an
incentive ineffective; this may include, for example, the choice of the wrong type of incentive,
the failure to target it strategically, and/or the failure to condition it appropriately. An incentive
may also not be an appropriate choice where the total costs outweigh the benefits. As discussed
in Parts II and IV, this includes assessing the costs associated with incentives.
Reasons for the unwarranted use of incentives
In spite of the futility or wastefulness of offering specific investment incentives in particular
circumstances, inefficient and redundant incentives continue to be offered. There are a number
of reasons why governments may continue to offer inefficient or ineffective incentives:
• Governments may think it is easier to offer tax incentives than to systematically improve
a country’s legal and institutional systems, improve physical infrastructure, implement
economic reforms, develop a skilled workforce, or provide a stable political environment—
even if those enabling environment conditions are much more important for attracting
and supporting investment.
• Businesses pressure governments into granting tax incentives, and vested interests in
business and even government lobby to keep them (IMF et al., 2015). This is exacerbated
by a different type of information asymmetry than that discussed above, whereby the
investor holds all the playing cards regarding the relative importance of various factors to
their decision-making and the government relies solely on the investor’s own claims that
an incentive is crucial to their decision as to whether to invest or not—even if that is not
actually the case.
• Politicians yield to political factors. For example, politicians may find it expedient to
offer tax incentives to send out an image of proactivity in addressing weak economies
or supporting particular regions, especially where proven interventions like upgrading
physical infrastructure or educational facilities are more likely to take a while to show
benefits (Rondinelli and Burpitt, 2000). They may provide certain incentives in spite of
advice from international organisations to not offer—or to remove—those incentives (IMF
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et al., 2015), or in direct disregard of expert recommendations based on specific evaluations
of the incentives programme.
• There is a lack of internal governmental coordination and communication, with ministries
for agriculture, investment, finance, and development working in silos and at crosspurposes, rather than uniting under a coherent strategy to achieve national goals.
• The global and regional phenomenon of the “race to the bottom,” where countries compete
against one another to lower taxes in a bid to win investments. This is a bigger challenge
with locational incentives (those seeking to attract/keep investment capital) than those
seeking to shape behaviour. This competition can negatively affect the welfare of other
countries and result in an “inefficient global allocation of capital” and a “collective loss of
output,” as all countries in a region end up lowering their tax rates but do not necessarily
attract greater investment (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016; IMF et al., 2015).

Incentives should be designed to support the outcomes encouraged by the CFS RAI
The CFS RAI specifically state that responsible investment “makes a significant contribution
to enhancing sustainable livelihoods, in particular for small-scale producers, and members
of marginalised and vulnerable groups, creating decent work for all agricultural and food
workers, eradicating poverty, fostering social and gender equality, eliminating the worst forms
of child labour, promoting social participation and inclusiveness, increasing economic growth,
and therefore achieving sustainable development” (CFS, 2014). While large-scale corporate
investments can be structured to help achieve these goals, there is no more direct avenue
than ensuring that the world’s hundreds of millions of small-scale producer households
(estimated to support some 2 billion people) are receiving the support they need to produce
as economically, socially, and environmentally sustainably as possible (Nwanze, 2011).

Recommendation: Prioritise the development of investment incentives that target
small-scale producers, especially youth and women, as well as micro- and smallscale enterprises upstream and downstream.
Given the great diversity among small-scale producers (discussed in Part I), different incentives
may be necessary to match differing needs. For instance, in the case of established—more
commonly male—small-scale producers, there may be no need to attract them to agriculture,
but rather to stimulate investments that allow them to conduct their activities sustainably and
productively.
Women face vastly different barriers to increased agricultural and food systems investment—
such as unequal access to education and information, and weaker individual and collective
agency (see Box 2)—and are likely to benefit from targeted support that recognises these social
and other barriers. For example, in the context of agricultural extension services, studies have
shown that careful targeting of information, extension officers who are trained on gender, and
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recruitment of female extension workers, among others, can all have positive effects (IFPRI,
2019; Mudege et al., 2017; Mamun-Ur-Rashid et al., 2017).
Young agri-entrepreneurs may require incentives that make agriculture more appealing, for
example by encouraging innovation and the employment of technologies and techniques that
will allow them to produce more with less (see Box 3). In this instance, incentives such as
incubation support for start-up businesses and technological packages might be appropriate.

Recommendation: Select different incentives for different sub-groups, depending
on their particular needs.
In designing incentives that support small-scale producers in an attempt to enhance
responsible agricultural and food systems investment, policymakers and technical staff must
take care to ensure that the incentives do not inadvertently undermine other objectives, such as
environmental sustainability or public health. For example, widespread provision of chemical
inputs without sufficient training or safety gear may end up negatively affecting farmers’ health
or the environment. Market price support may ultimately result in environmental harms by
encouraging overproduction or intensive monocropping.

Recommendation: Design incentives in recognition of the different dimensions of
responsible agricultural and food systems investment, so as to not blindly pursue
one dimension (e.g. food security) at the expense of others (e.g. biodiversity).
Reconsidering and managing incentives oriented towards large-scale foreign
investors
Risks of excessive focus on large-scale foreign investors
Incentives should not disproportionately benefit large-scale foreign investors to the detriment of
other investors. As noted above, the majority of agricultural and food systems investment in lowand middle-income countries comes from domestic farmers, with FDI only providing a fraction
of total investment in agriculture and food systems. Governments may find it to be a much better
use of scarce resources to target incentives to address barriers faced by domestic farmers and
SMEs operating upstream and downstream along the value chain (Syed and Miyazako, 2013).
Although responsible foreign investment can bring multiple benefits and contribute to a
country’s development goals, many negative impacts—including serious human rights abuses
and severe environmental damage—have also arisen from large-scale foreign investments in
agriculture and food systems. In light of the track record of such investments and their inherent
risks, the consistency of large-scale foreign investments in agriculture and food systems with
the principles espoused in the CFS RAI is not a given.
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Recommendation: Avoid placing an outsized emphasis on using incentives to
attract FDI, and limit barriers that favour certain sized investors over others (e.g.
minimum investment size requirements).
Ways to ensure foreign large-scale investments are responsible
This is not to say that large-scale investments in agriculture and food systems have no place in
a country’s agricultural development plan. For example, certain types of crops—including cash
crops like sugarcane and palm oil, as well as certain cereals—have agronomic characteristics
that make large-scale production the more obvious choice (Chan, 2013). Yet even these crops
do not necessarily require the allocation of large swathes of land; rather, large-scale investment
using inclusive business approaches that permit smallholders to retain their land rights (such
as through outgrower schemes) can also be an option.
To the extent that a country continues to include the attraction of large-scale foreign
investment into the agricultural and food sector as part of its national development plan, any
use of incentives oriented towards such investors should include the following considerations.
First, no investment must be allowed to contravene the CFS RAI to the detriment of human
rights (e.g. violating local peoples’ legitimate land tenure rights), the environment (e.g.
polluting waterways), and the host country’s sustainable development (e.g. tax evasion). This is
true regardless of whether an incentive is offered.
To prevent such contraventions, governments should ensure that its domestic law protects
human rights and the environment from potential investment-related harms. Safeguards can
also be embedded at the approval stage, for example, by ensuring adequate due diligence
and screening of potential investments,32 and through the use of robust impact assessments. In
addition, although investment contracts are not recommended (see Part II above), to the extent
that investment contracts are used, they can explicitly incorporate additional safeguards that
go beyond what is currently required by law, and can “mak[e] noncompliance a violation of
legally binding contractual terms” (FAO, 2016).
Second, any incentive provided to a large-scale investment should support that investment’s
contributions to the goals contained in the CFS RAI. Such goals include increased food security
and nutrition, sustainable and inclusive economic development and the eradication of poverty,
women and youth empowerment, conservation and sustainable management of natural
resources, and supporting diversity and innovation.
Policymakers and technical staff can seek to do this through the conditions (discussed later
in this Part) that are attached to the incentives. For example, investments will be permitted
accelerated depreciation on project-related assets if training is provided through the project
to upskill women. Or, for example, an incentive will be provided to investors that integrate
32 It is valuable to research the social, labour, and environmental records of potential large-scale investors. One widely used tool to investigate

companies for problematic behaviours is the Good Jobs First database, Violation Tracker: https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/violation-tracker.
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inclusive business approaches (demonstrated by meeting clear and objective criteria). When
attaching conditions, the incentives should be granted only upon proof that conditions were
met, and are revocable if the investment breaches the CFS RAI principles. This could take the
form of a provision in the relevant law offering the incentive, declaring that incentives may
be revoked if any attached conditions are not met, or if the investment breaches the CFS RAI
principles and no effort is made to remedy that breach.

Recommendation: Enshrine adequate safeguards in legislation to protect human
rights and the environment in the context of investment. Use additional measures,
such as due diligence and screening, to assess whether an investment is likely to
contribute to, or undermine, the realisation of human rights and achievement of
development priorities.
Recommendation: Consider attaching conditions that support the achievement
of CFS RAI goals to incentives offered to foreign large-scale investors, and make
those incentives revocable in instances where conditions are not met.
Regional governance and coordination are important
In the context of locational incentives, countries ideally would coordinate to not offer
unnecessary incentives and would simply compete for FDI on the basis of competitive conditions
like factor endowments, legal and institutional stability, adequate infrastructure, and political
stability. In practice, however, countries’ ability to coordinate effectively has been stymied
the absence of “an effective supranational monitoring framework and powerful institutions to
enforce it” (IMF et al., 2015). Without such coordination, abstaining from unnecessary incentives
is not easy, due to the pressure created when other countries offer incentives (particularly tax
incentives).
Even if countries do seek to coordinate on either tax incentives or broader tax policy, potential
risks may arise. One risk is that agreeing to eliminate tax incentives could shift competition
into general tax policies, such as a reduction in overall corporate income tax rates. The second
is that if only a subset of the relevant countries agree to coordinate, those countries who do
not cooperate might benefit at the cost of those who do (IMF et al., 2015).
Regional efforts to coordinate on harmful tax competition have experienced varying degrees
of success to date (IMF et al., 2015).33 Nonetheless, options for regional cooperation do exist.
As noted by the IMF, World Bank, UNCTAD, and OECD, a non-binding option would be a code
of conduct agreeing not to use certain tax incentives, like the Code of Conduct for business
33 Example discussed: Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Finance and Investment and Guidelines for the

application and treatment of tax incentives in the SADC region; East African Community (EAC) Code of Conduct; West African Economic
and Monetary Union (WEAMU); Committee of Ministers of Finance of Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic (COSEFIN)
“Declaration of Good Practices” discussions.
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taxation in the European Union. A binding option could be a common legislative framework,
like the state-aid rules in the European Union (IMF et al., 2015). A more modest option would
be to focus on “a common framework for reporting tax incentives and information exchange
to encourage mutual learning” with the goal of enhancing transparency and enabling ex post
assessment of tax incentives (Teijeiro, 2015).
In the interim, and to the extent that countries continue to offer investment incentives via
contract (not recommended), publishing a list of available incentives on a regional website
would provide greater transparency, with the goal of minimising pressure on government
negotiators in contractual negotiations. By doing so, this disclosure could make it easier to
avoid a regional race to the bottom, as government negotiators gain bargaining power by
seeing what other countries offer, thus minimising companies’ ability to use opacity to their
advantage (Charlton, 2003). There is a risk, however, that such transparency could function as
a double-edged sword, if countries feel pressure to match other countries’ incentives based on
what is published. This suggestion is made in conjunction with the recommendation that the
optimal way to offer investment incentives is in national legislation (see discussion in Part II of
this guide) and not at the individual contract level.
Despite the challenges, it will be critically important for governments to find ways to cooperate
in order to stem the race to the bottom that leads to redundant incentive use. Abstaining
from unnecessary incentives in a coordinated way can help governments to ensure that the
objectives behind the incentives they offer are linked to their national priorities, as well as to
regional development priorities.34

Recommendation: Participate in regional efforts to curb redundant incentive use
and to combat the “race to the bottom.”
Attaching conditions to incentives can be essential for promoting responsible
and sustainable practices beyond what is required by law
Attaching conditions to incentives can be one way to use incentives to promote more
responsible investment aligned with the CFS RAI. Using conditions, governments can
encourage specific responsible and sustainable practices that go beyond what is required by
law, while also ensuring that incentives are not provided when investments do not support
responsible practices. For example, payments for ecosystem or environmental services are a
popular mechanism for encouraging environmentally sensitive agricultural practices. They are
essentially just a grant (or even a loan or loan guarantee) that is given to an investor provided
the investor complies with an environmental condition or conditions:
Incentive (type: grant) + Condition (type: environmental)
34 Regional coordination can and should extend beyond coordination on incentives to other aspects of aligning investment with the CFS RAI.

This is explicitly acknowledged in the Association of South East Asian Nations Responsible Investment in Agriculture (ASEAN RAI) Guidelines on
Promoting Responsible Investment in Food, Agriculture and Forestry, which highlight the importance of “promoting intra-regional assistance,
experience sharing, and capacity building on issues related to responsible investment in food, agriculture, and forestry to strengthen ASEAN
Member States governments’ capacity on legal, policy and implementation issues.” Principle 10.
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Such payments can be particularly important for small-scale producers who tend to lack the
capital to implement climate- and environmentally-sensitive changes into their practices, such
as creating ponds for enhanced water storage (costs cover creation and any loss in agricultural
production) (Smith et al., 2013; One Planet and UNEP, 2019).
A condition may not be relevant in all instances of incentive use. Relevance depends on the goal
the government is seeking to achieve. For example, if a government wants to encourage reinvestment in an existing large-scale plantation but only if more environmentally-sound farming
practices are employed, the incentive that may be offered to the investor could be coupled with
a condition that the benefit only be conferred upon proof of cover cropping, planting hedge
rows, or some other relevant practice(s). In this context, conditions, when coupled with the right
type of incentive, can help filter the types of investments governments wish to encourage and
shape agricultural practices to better fit sustainable food system outcomes.
In another scenario, however, a condition may not be necessary. For example, the government’s
goal may be for smallholders’ incomes to increase through greater productivity, and so the
government may offer a technological incentive in the form of a more environmentally
appropriate plant or livestock variety. In this case, if the farmer takes advantage of that
incentive and invests accordingly, the outcome will be achieved (assuming the government
has selected the correct variety), and the farmer’s productivity should increase by virtue of
farming with the improved variety; no condition would be needed.
Importantly, conditions do not work if the incentive does not work, underscoring the need to
offer incentives that will actually motivate investors in the manner intended.
Conditions are determined by the government’s goals for the targeted investments, which in turn
should be grounded in national development priorities more generally. The conditions most
likely to be relevant for responsible agricultural and food systems investments are therefore
those linked to environmental, social, health, and nutritional issues, as well as locational or
other behavioural conditions. As discussed above in Box 9, however, certain aspects of these
issues should instead be addressed in law, rather than through incentives.
For some incentives, particularly those targeting large-scale investors, performance-based
approaches can be an effective way to ensure that incentives with conditions lead to desired
outcomes. Under a performance-based approach, the incentive is contingent on demonstrated
impact. This approach can be more likely to result in intended impact than when incentives
are provided without a condition, or when they are provided based on an investor’s practice
or activity (rather than based on the impact) (OECD, 2020). However, a performance-based
approach is often not appropriate for small-scale producers, who may not have enough capital
to take certain actions that result in impact without upfront support, or who may not be able to
afford to wait for that impact to manifest. In such instances, it is more appropriate to provide
an incentive once a practice is modified or an activity undertaken (UNDP, n.d.).
Such nuances reinforce the need to ensure that incentive planning and design is participatory
and needs driven, especially to identify the practical challenges confronted by the diverse
range of small-scale producers who may be intended targets of the incentives.
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Recommendation: Consider attaching environmental, social, health, behavioural,
or other conditions to incentives in order to achieve desired investment-related
impacts that align with national development priorities.
Incentives may work best as part of a package
Investment incentives are but one potential mechanism in a raft of measures necessary to
achieve responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. Beyond selecting the right
incentive, and potentially coupling that incentive with a condition, the effectiveness of an
incentive may be enhanced by packaging it with other measures. This is because providing
incentives as part of a package can better support the investor in using the incentive(s) more
effectively (Fiedler, 2020).
There are multiple ways that agricultural and food systems investment incentives can be
packaged to enhance their effectiveness and their ability to support responsible investment.
These include:
• Packaging multiple complementary incentives together. For example, under such an
approach, a concessional loan to small-scale producers could be combined with training,
mentoring, and coaching; in such a package, the financial incentive may be put to more
effective use when the recipient also receives the complementary technical support
incentives.
• Providing incentives against the backdrop of a sound regulatory regime that may also
include disincentives, such as a taxes, fines, and prohibition of use. This, in essence, is
strengthening the enabling environment alongside incentive provisions; but can also be
viewed as combining the “stick” of disincentives (such as environmental laws that ban
certain types of conduct or a land tax that discourages harmful practices) with the “carrot”
of incentives.
• Coupled with complementary government investments, such as research into sustainable
productions systems (FAO, n.d.).
Packaging may involve any one or more of the above. For example, price interventions and the
provision of credit coupled with public investment in research and development and extension
services, strong institutions, and investments in primary education and rural infrastructure
(especially electrification and irrigation) have been shown to be successful in removing
countries’ anti-agricultural biases (Laborde et al., 2019). Importantly, different incentives may
be relevant at different stages and may seek to effect short- or long-term changes.
When it comes to incentives for women, youth, or other historically marginalised groups,
providing a package is generally preferable over stand-alone incentives in order to achieve the
expected results. This is true even if it means that a smaller number of beneficiaries will profit
from the intervention due to constrained budgets. Of particular importance is the element
of skills developments through training and coaching. In order to actively and meaningfully
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participate in policy design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation processes of new
incentives, and then to take advantage of such an intervention, youth and women need the
right skills. Their potentially limited advocacy, business, or technical skills can otherwise be
significant constraints, preventing them from effectively defending their interests and from
taking advantage of incentives available to help them develop and maintain a viable livelihood
in agriculture. So, while access to a grant may be a precondition to enable youth and women
to invest in agriculture and food systems, packaging that grant with additional services, like
access to equipment or harvest facilities, access to business incubators, and ongoing training,
coaching, and other advisory services, will empower them to develop, pilot, and implement
projects that are economically viable and impactful (Fiedler, 2020). The following Nigerian
and Mauritanian case studies provide practical examples of how incentives may be packaged.

Case Study: Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural
Lending
Owned by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and instituted in partnership with
the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Nigerian Bankers’
Committee in 2013, the Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural
Lending (NIRSAL Plc) aims to raise millions of Nigerian farmers above the poverty
line by de-risking agricultural lending. Primarily, NIRSAL encourages financiers and
investors to lend to the agribusiness sector by providing Credit Risk Guarantees,
thereby sharing the risk and catalysing financial and investment flows into
agricultural value chains, and increasing smallholder farmers’ access to credit.
In addition to Credit Risk Guarantees, NIRSAL (NIRSAL, n.d.):
• offers technical assistance to producers, so that loans received are used more
effectively;
• rates banks based on the effectiveness of their lending and social impact;
• offers banks incentives for building their lending capabilities; and
• facilitates the formation of new systems such as producer cooperatives and
transportation systems that will cut costs for the transportation of produce.
Before NIRSAL’s inception, 2 percent of bank lending in Nigeria was used for
agricultural lending, as opposed to 6 percent in comparable developing countries
like Kenya (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2012). Despite NIRSAL’s efforts over the last
decade, however, lending institutions remain reluctant to finance certain areas
of the agricultural value chains (Abdulhameed, 2016). To date, NIRSAL has seen
USD 500.7 million loans, and 677 projects, guaranteed, and estimates 400,000 jobs
created as a result. Their goal is to increase agricultural lending to 7 percent of total
lending in Nigeria by 2026 (Abdulhameed, 2019).
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Case Study: Mauritania, Union Nationale des Mutuelles d’Investissement et
de Crédit Oasien et des zones pluviales (UNMICO)35
In Mauritania, a specific micro-finance institution—Union Nationale des Mutuelles
d’Investissement et de Crédit Oasien et des zones pluviales (UNMICO)—provides
loans to the agricultural sector. UNMICO has the merit of combining rural credit
at low interest rates with capacity development support to ensure the economic
viability of an investment, which is particularly important.
UNMICO manages local caisses (funds with a specific cash desk) in partnership with
local economic agents (cooperatives, producer organisations, farmers and others)
who will become co-owners (“sociétaires”) of the caisse and should gradually
increase their managerial and financial responsibilities. The main objective of the
caisses is the provision of short-term micro-loans, which constitute 80 percent of
the loan portfolio.
Prior to setting up a caisse, UNMICO carries out feasibility studies and engages with
local stakeholders to identify and prioritise key challenges, as well as their potential
solutions based on a set of economic, technical, and sociocultural criteria.
Subsequently, UNMICO provides training to sociétaires and beneficiaries on various
issues, including financial literacy and management, accounting practices, or
management and governance of a caisse and other organisations. UNMICO also
ensures regular follow-up and monitoring with each caisse and the beneficiaries to
contribute to the durability of each project (UNMICO. n.d.).

Combining incentives into “inclusive, integrated packages” maximises efficacy and can
support greater uptake of sustainable practices (FAO, 2018b). Yet selecting the right incentive
or package of incentives relies on careful planning and design, as addressed in Part IV of this
guide.

Recommendation: Consider how incentives may be packaged—whether by
packaging multiple complementary incentives together, providing incentives
against the backdrop of a sound regulatory regime that may also include
disincentives, or coupling incentives with complementary government
investments—in order to better support target investors’ effective use of
incentives.
35 This case study is adapted from: Fiedler, (2020).
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Part IV - Planning for, designing,
implementing, monitoring,
and evaluating incentives
for responsible agricultural
and food systems
This section provides guidance for policymakers and technical staff on all stages of incentives: from
planning for a possible intervention that might take the form of an incentive, through to evaluating
incentives that have been provided and making decisions based on learnings from the evaluations.
This guide suggests an adaptive approach to incentives. Such an approach can support informed
decisions about the use and design of incentives; it also implies consistent efforts to monitor and
evaluate incentives, and to adapt incentives based on learnings in order to increase the likelihood
that incentives will support desired outcomes (FOS, 2017). This approach is strengthened through
increased transparency and inclusive participatory processes. This section provides guidance for
developing and managing incentives using the framework below (Webb et al., 2018).

LEARNING

54

Planning for an appropriate intervention
Before any specific investment incentives are designed, careful planning can help to clarify
whether investment incentives are an appropriate intervention.
A starting point for this planning is to understand the government’s national development priorities
and how they relate to the government’s long-term goals with respect to responsible investment in
agriculture and food systems. This guide assumes that policymakers and technical staff considering
the use of incentives already have some clarity regarding these priorities and goals, which may
include, for example, goals to eradicate rural poverty, increase food security and nutrition among
small-scale producers, and foster gender equality and empower youth in rural areas.
With an understanding of those general national development priorities and impacts, the first
steps in planning for an intervention—one that might take the form of an incentive—are to
identify the needs of investors in agriculture and food systems, the barriers to responsible
investment in agriculture and food systems, the problems that the government is trying to
address, and what the government is hoping to achieve with the intervention. These crucial
steps will enable policymakers and technical staff to ascertain whether incentives are the
most appropriate mechanism and, if so, how to design them effectively.
To support this assessment of whether an incentive is the right mechanism, governments can
develop a theory of change. A theory of change is an “on-going process of discussion-based
analysis and learning that produces powerful insights … [and is] communicated through diagrams
and narratives which are updated at regular intervals” (Vogel, 2012). A theory of change is
particularly useful when planning an intervention that seeks to address complex and multi-causal
challenges. It can be developed during the planning phase, but can also support the design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of an incentive or other government measure.
This section describes the steps that policymakers and technical staff can take during the
planning stage of an intervention that might take the form of an incentive, and discusses how
a theory of change can be developed and used to support the planning process. While these
steps are presented sequentially, the process does not necessarily have to be followed in a
linear fashion. Rather, these steps can be viewed as a set of good practices that support both
the effective planning for policy interventions that may include incentives and the reform of
existing incentives (FOS, 2017).

CONDUCT CONTEXT
ANALYSIS

DEVELOP THEORY
OF CHANGE

• Overview of jurisdiction
• Identify target population
• Undertake causal analysis
• Stakeholder engagement

• Articulate desired impact
• Map pathway of change
• Identify assumptions

SELECT
INTERVENTION
TYPES

ALLOCATE ROLES
&
RESPONSABILITIES

• Select appropiate intervention
• Select appropiate incentive type
• Review the theory of change
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1. Conduct a Context Analysis
Policymakers and technical staff considering the use of an incentive can start with a context
analysis that seeks to understand and identify the characteristics and conditions of the
setting for which the incentive is contemplated. This should include, most critically, the
needs of investors in agriculture and food systems, which connote the barriers or unmet
problems they face, and the underlying causes of those needs, so that an appropriate
intervention can be developed. As such, participatory processes that include intended
beneficiaries, such as small-scale producers or other investors, can be critical during this
planning stage (see Box 10).
The methods employed to inform the context analysis will depend on the jurisdiction
and on the availability of resources and capacity. Broadly speaking, they may include
information and evidence gathered from: past policies; previous studies or social science
theory (Stein, 2012); surveys, census data, or field visits; and, most critically, from investors
themselves.
Ideally, the following elements should feed into the context analysis:
• Overview of jurisdiction or subsector: An overview provides a background on the
events, practices, and policies that have shaped the current context in a jurisdiction
or subsector. What are the leading economic, environmental, political, and social
dynamics that have informed the current context? What issues, if any, have had a
disproportionate impact on the context, e.g. natural disasters, economic crises, or
political conflicts? What past measures have been implemented? Have interventions
attempted to increase responsible investment in agriculture and food systems? What
policies failed or succeeded, and why? (FAO, 2019b).
• Identification of target population: In the context of responsible investment in
agriculture and food systems, the investors that may benefit from an intervention,
such as an incentive, should be identified. These could include, for example, smalland medium-scale producers and micro/small enterprises, young agri-entrepreneurs,
women farmers, or other marginalised populations. Given the diversity of investors and
the desire to leave no one behind, it is critical to consider the particular challenges of
specific groups, such as women, youth, and small-scale producers, who have different
needs and will be affected differently by an intervention.
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BOX 10: INCLUSIVE AND EQUITABLE PARTICIPATION
Using a participatory approach through which small-scale producers and other investors
can actively participate in planning and decision-making processes fosters cooperation,
facilitates consensus of results to be achieved, and provides more representative and
meaningful insight to the given context (Maennling and Correa, 2020), which in turn
increase the likelihood that outcomes will be defined realistically and achieved (Roberts
and Khattri, 2012). In order to support equitable participation of marginalised groups,
cultural norms and power dynamics should be taken into account (IIED, 2019). Based on
this, specific efforts should be undertaken to enable the participation of women, youth,
and indigenous communities, who often confront obstacles in effectively participating
in decision-making processes relevant to investment or incentives due to factors such
as power imbalances, institutional biases, and lack of access to relevant information.
Participatory approaches may vary, depending on the resources available, the potential
scope of intervention, and other factors. Good practice suggests that:
• Governments should start with a well-informed plan (covering, for example, which
investors to engage, which government agencies should be involved, the levels and
methods of engagement; and time frame and resources required) (FAO, 2005).
• Once engaged, investors and other stakeholders can be supported to assess the
current situation and identify possible policy changes and interventions, using a
range of tools and techniques (FAO, 2005).
• Levels of engagement may range from consultations through to specific opportunities
to collaborate on design. Formal institutionalised opportunities for policy dialogue—
including through multi-stakeholder platforms—may be a particularly useful method
to enable participation in ongoing planning and policymaking processes (Fiedler, 2020).
• Causal Analysis: Understanding the causes of any identified problems or needs—as well
as the drivers of those causes—is a critical part of developing a theory of change, and
helps set the stage as the rationale for the intervention to be developed.36 To undertake
a casual analysis, start by identifying the core problems faced by a target population
(potentially narrowed by factors such as location and subsector). These can be broad
problems, e.g. high poverty levels or widespread food insecurity; or more narrow
problems, e.g. decline in crop productivity. Are the problems identified by women and
by men different?

36 Consider the following questions: What are the problems facing investors, and that block them from investing more, in a responsible

manner? Who is affected by those problems? Who is particularly vulnerable? What are the consequences of the problem? What are the causes
of the problem – individual capacities and/or relationships; financial resources; environmental changes; institutions; infrastructural systems;
legal system? What are the barriers to change? What are the opportunities to overcome these barriers? Who else is working to address the
problem(s)? What is not happening? (Noble, 2019).
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Next, analyse the underlying causes of these problems. Ask “why” the problem exists,
and keep asking until the possible reasons are exhausted (FAO, 2019b). Potential causes
can range from structural factors, to economic, environmental, social, or political
factors. In turn, identify the drivers of those causes. Are there problems that result from
the gender-based division of labour or from inequitable access to resources? (FAO,
2005).
This analysis may also surface other factors, such as potential opportunities to help
overcome some of the barriers identified, or potential constraints that may make
overcoming some of the barriers challenging.
• Stakeholder Engagement: During the context analysis, policymakers and technical
staff should use a framework for identifying those entities and individuals37 that
may affect or be affected by a potential intervention, including the impacts of any
investments made because of the intervention. A strategy should be in place to engage
these different groups, e.g. through a series of stakeholder workshops, in order to
examine how the groups differ in their roles, interests, priorities and concerns, their
knowledge and skillset, and how they can contribute to (or obstruct) the outcomes
of an intervention. It is also helpful to analyse the power distribution among these
groups, and to incorporate strategies to mitigate potential conflict or turn them into
opportunities for collaboration (Caldwell, 2002). This stakeholder engagement should
support participatory approaches to planning (see Box 10).
2. Develop the Theory of Change
Armed with the information collected during the context analysis, the theory of change
itself can now be developed. The development of this theory of change should be done in
partnership with the target population (and other key stakeholders, where appropriate),
who bring specific knowledge and experience to help inform this effort. The resulting
theory of change represents the group’s best understanding or hypothesis, at that
particular point in time, of how changes are anticipated to happen so that activities (such
as the provision of an incentive) would lead to desired impacts.
At its core, developing a strong theory of change requires the three steps below. Once
developed, a theory of change can be represented in a visual diagram and/or described
in a narrative summary (See Annex I for a detailed example).
• Articulate the long-term desired impact: Once the problems and needs have been
identified, policymakers and technical staff can shift from focusing on the problems to
focusing on the solutions (Hivos, 2015). This can be done by articulating in a statement:

37 These may include national, sub-national and local governments, the private sector, financial institutions, target populations, legitimate

tenure rights holders, the community at large, etc.
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- the long-term desired impact that a potential intervention intends to address
(“what”);
- the target population that will benefit from the intervention (“who”); and
- the purpose for the desired change (“why”).
• Map the pathway of change: Mapping a pathway of change is done by working
backwards from the long-term desired impact, to the medium- and short-term
outcomes, and to the outputs (or activities), asking at each level “what element is
necessary and sufficient in order to achieve the change at the next level.” This can be
organised in a chain of “if-then” statements, and should flow logically, e.g. if output
X is achieved, then it is reasonably logical that outcome Y is attainable (Pringle and
Thomas 2019). If one element does not logically link to the next, what else can be
included? See Figure 1 for elements to consider when developing a theory of change.
By clarifying the linkages, the theory of change provides a rationale for the choice of
activities (intervention), a justification of resources (input), and a framework to support
the development of indicators and targets for the monitoring, evaluation and learning
stage (See Annex I for details on selecting proper indicators and targets for each result
expected in the pathway of change).
• Identify assumptions: The linkages between each level identified on a pathway of
change are only valid if certain conditions are met or in place. What evidence is there
that each element leads to the next? If there is weak or no evidence, the link is an
assumption. It is important to identify the assumptions made at each causal linkage.
These may include assumptions about the target population’s reactions to a changed
situation, the internal and external conditions that need to be in place at each level,
and the causality assumed in the pathway, including the expectations about how or why
the activity proposed will bring about the change envisaged (Hivos, 2015). Articulating
these assumptions can improve the design of an incentive or other intervention, lead
to more coordinated and focused action, enable adaptive planning, form a good basis
for risk management, support more focused learning and evaluation, and increase
credibility (Hivos, 2015).
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Figure 1 - Elements of a Theory of Change

Examples

Elements

Planned
intervention

Expected Results

Inputs/Activities

Outputs

Assumptions

Outcomes
Assumptions

• Resources
- Financial
- Human
- Technological
- Information

• Numbers
- Trained
- Sensitized

• Workshops

• Built
- Infrastructure
- Facilities
- Partnerships

• Meetings
• Services
• Products

• Purchased
- Equipment

• Developed
- Products
- Services
- Ideas

Impact
Assumptions

• Short-term
- Awareness
- Knowledge
- Skills
- Attitude
- Motivation
- Opportunity

• Changes in
conditions
- Social
- Economic
- Political
- Environmental
- Legal

• Medium-term
- Behaviours
- Capacities
- Practices
- Decision-making
- Policies

Adapted from source: IIED, (2019), at 96.

3. Select the intervention (and decide whether to offer an incentive)
The theory of change can help policymakers and technical staff explore different
options—including the use of incentives—to try to find the most appropriate intervention
for the problems identified and the impact sought. For example, the theory of change
may uncover multiple interventions that could help to achieve a desired impact, as well
as their relative strengths, weaknesses, and accompanying assumptions. Based on this
information, policymakers and technical staff can:
• Select an appropriate intervention: Develop criteria to help select an intervention that
could achieve the desired impact. Some common criteria include: the available budget;
the desired impact and timescale to achieve the desired impact; sphere of control
and influence (Hivos, 2015); social acceptability; community support; management,
implementation and monitoring support and capacity; sustainability; technical feasibility;
political sensitivity; level of risk (Caldwell, n.d.); and the potential to collaborate and
coordinate with other government agencies, programmes, or institutions.
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• Based on the criteria, select an appropriate intervention. As discussed above, incentives
are just one option to be considered among many, and they are often not the most
appropriate intervention. The theory of change, and criteria for selecting an intervention,
however, can help in identifying when an incentive would be an appropriate mechanism
for achieving the government’s desired impact.
• Select the appropriate incentive type, if an incentive is selected: In cases where an
investment incentive is identified as the most appropriate intervention, consideration
should be given to the best type(s) of incentive(s) to provide—including whether to
undertake complementary actions or to provide incentive packages (discussed above
in Part III). The choice of incentive will depend on a number of factors, including: the
desired impact of the incentive; the target beneficiaries of the incentive; the available
budget; and the capacity available to administer and enforce it.
• Review the theory of change: Once the incentive (or other intervention) is chosen, the
theory of change can be revisited to interrogate this choice. Is the theory of change
for this incentive logical? Are there missing steps? Does any step lead to unintended
consequences, positive or negative? Are gender inequalities, dynamics, and needs
taken to account? To what extent do the outcomes work out differently for women and
men, as well as for youth and older farmers or more established entrepreneurs? (Hivos,
2015).
4. If an incentive is chosen, allocate roles and responsibilities for designing and implementing
the incentive
If an incentive is chosen as the most appropriate intervention, the next step will be
designing the incentive, as discussed in the section below. Prior to designing an incentive,
it is critical to clearly allocate roles and responsibilities among relevant government
entities. Each agency or authority anticipated to have a role should be identified, its role
and responsibilities clarified, and sufficient resources allocated.
Problems may arise if roles are not clearly allocated. For instance, monitoring the
effectiveness of a tax incentive may be a matter for the Ministry of Finance. However, the
information on forgone revenue due to the tax incentive may be with the tax administration,
while information about the impact of the incentive, such as the number of jobs created,
may be with the sector regulator, and its compliance with conditions set out in a contract,
such as environmental standards, with the environmental agency. The Ministry of Finance
must be confident that the tax administration, sector regulator, and environmental agency
have the legal right to collect the data, and are in fact collecting the data, that it needs for
its role in evaluating the incentives (United Nations, 2018).
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Designing investment incentives
When designing an investment incentive, government officials should ensure that each
incentive:
1. has a clear policy objective that aligns with national development priorities;
2. is appropriately targeted and has clear eligibility criteria;
3. can be easily and fairly administered;
4. will be granted at the right stage of the investment;
5. has a defined time frame; and
6. is specifically budgeted for.
Each of these elements is discussed in turn. Annex II provides additional notes on designing tax
incentives for the limited contexts in which they are deemed appropriate.
1. Ensure the incentive has a clear objective that aligns with national development priorities
Each incentive should have a clear and strategic objective that aligns with national
development priorities and sustainable development goals. The strategic objective may
include a series of sub-objectives that will vary by jurisdiction depending on economic
and political factors (Parilla and Liu, 2018). These objectives should take into account
the needs identified during the planning phase, and should be supported by the theory of
change developed at that time. This helps to ensure that the incentive is designed in a way
that is logical.
Participatory processes during the design phase can also enable government to account
for investor and other stakeholder needs when designing new incentives.
2. Decide on the appropriate level of targeting and use clear eligibility criteria
• Incentives can be tailored narrowly or more broadly, depending on the objective of the
incentive. For example, eligibility criteria might include:
- type of activity (e.g. R&D, production, market facilitation);
- size of investor or investment (e.g. small-, medium-, large-scale);
- identity of target beneficiary (e.g. marginalised groups; domestic or foreign investors;
etc.);
- specific location in need of investment; and/or
- compliance with specified conditions, with objective and quantifiable performance
criteria (e.g. linked to local employment; inclusive business approaches; climatesmart production practices; ecosystem services; etc.).
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Targeting criteria should be selected carefully, keeping in mind the objectives, desired
impact, and intended beneficiaries of the incentives. Targeting involves a deliberate
balancing process. On the one hand, offering incentives too broadly may increase the
likelihood of providing redundant incentives. On the other, narrowing criteria excessively
may risk excluding investors whose investments could support the government’s goals.
This underscores the importance of carefully assessing the potential impacts and costs of
particular incentives.
The eligibility criteria should be simple and clear. Carefully crafted criteria can help to
ensure that targeted investors or investments are actually the ones who receive incentives.
Clear criteria can also manage investor expectations. This, in turn, can help to avoid
disputes with investors who expect to be eligible for a specific incentive based on broad
or ambiguous language.
3. Minimise discretion in the granting of incentives
Incentives can be awarded automatically or through a discretionary process that requires
an application and approval.
Under an automatic process (sometimes referred to as rules-based process), an incentive
provided for in the applicable law is automatically available to any potential beneficiary
who meets the prescribed objective eligibility criteria. An automatic process should be
used for any tax incentives offered. Automatic processes are also preferable when the
incentive is targeted more broadly. The advantages of this method are its simplicity of
administration, including the approval, implementation, and monitoring processes; savings
on transaction costs; and the minimal discretion and increased transparency that reduce
the potential for corruption (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016).
A discretionary process requires that a potential beneficiary go through an approval
process or allows an investor to negotiate on a case-by-case basis with the relevant agency
or authority to obtain the incentive or incentive package. Discretionary processes may be
more appropriate, for example, when an assessment of the potential beneficiary’s ability
to use the incentive effectively is required. And for governments with strong administrative
capacity, discretionary processes may be less likely to result in redundant incentives,
thereby reducing overall spending on incentives. However, the discretionary method is
more likely to enable corruption, especially with respect to how objectively and thoroughly
merit is assessed by the relevant administrating agency. Given this greater potential for
abuse, a discretionary process should still incorporate many non-discretionary elements,
such as objective eligibility criteria, as well as criteria to determine set amounts/value
of an incentive that an eligible investor can receive. Discretionary processes can also
include several stages of approval, and should be subject to ongoing monitoring (TavaresLehmann et al., 2016; Brennan and Ruane, 2016).
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4. Select the right timing: ex ante vs. ex post
Incentives may be granted before the investment is made (ex ante or front-loaded) or
after the investment has met qualifying conditions or achieved expected results (ex post
or back-loaded). Ex ante provisions are based on the expectation of future, unconfirmed
performance by the beneficiary. While they are the preferred method by investors and
producers, they can be undermined by investors who do not deliver the expected results
or who invest only until the incentive ends. For domestic small-scale producers and
especially for under-represented groups, such as women, youth, and so on, however, ex
ante provision of incentives may be essential for investments to be made by them.
Ex post provisions are based on the compliance of conditions by the beneficiary of the
incentive. For large-scale investors, incentives should be tied to meeting qualifying
conditions and offered on an ex post basis. Conditions may be defined in terms of
export targets, employment targets, the establishment of certain activities like R&D,
use of environmentally-friendly technology, or other conditions aimed at achieving the
jurisdiction’s sustainable development goals. This performance-based approach helps
governments to ensure that they only offer incentives to qualifying investors that meet
any corresponding conditions and obligations; such an approach can be administratively
easier for governments than attempting to use “claw-back” provisions when investors
fail to meet their obligations tied to any incentives that were provided ex ante (TavaresLehmann et al., 2016).
5. Establish a clear timeframe: continuity and duration
An incentive can be offered as a one-time event, as in a matching grant or a training
course, or continuously over a set number of years, as in a mentorship programme for
youth in agriculture. For small-scale producers, continuous incentives can be attractive,
although also risky: if they become overly reliant on non-institutionalised incentives,
for example, they risk making decisions based on incentives that might be terminated
prematurely.
The time frame during which an incentive is offered, and its results measured, should
be specified. This may help investors, small or large, make more informed decisions.
Specified time frames can also reduce the risk that the incentives programme is kept alive
due to administrative or political inertia or despite its ineffectiveness.38 For legislated
tax incentives, for example, the inclusion of “sunset” clauses (where the legislation
automatically expires after a specified number of years unless proactively extended) is
considered good practice (see Annex II).
While some stability and continuity of incentives can support informed investor decisionmaking, governments should always retain appropriate flexibility to end incentives
38 Tax incentives, such as tax holidays, tend to remain in the statute books well after the original period for which they were granted and

well after any benefit for such a policy has been exhausted. This creates a financial burden on the State without any benefit (Johnson et al.
forthcoming).
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programmes if deemed ineffective or if the incentives are no longer in line with their
development priorities. This is particularly important to signal around incentives that
might be relied on by foreign large-scale investors, who may seek to resort to investorstate dispute settlement proceedings when incentives are removed (see Box 5). In the
case of incentives targeted at small-scale producers, however, provision should be made
to ensure they are not excessively harmed by the revocation of such incentives. This
may take, for example, the form of a staggered removal of the benefit incurred from the
incentive, or adequate social protection to mitigate against harm.
6. Understand costs and disclose expenditure budget
Incentives need to be designed with due regard to a jurisdiction’s available budget.
Understanding the costs of a potential incentive is critical for assessing whether the
incentive is worth its costs, whether it is a sensible use of public resources,39 and its
implications for the government’s ability to pursue its sustainable development goals.
When assessing the costs of an incentive, governments should also consider “hidden
costs.” There are many hidden costs of incentives; examples include opportunity costs,
the cost of offering a redundant incentive, and the costs of inefficient allocation of capital
(Thomas, 2007).
If a potential incentive is deemed worth its cost, the government must ensure that the
associated budget includes sufficient funds for its implementation, administration,
consistent monitoring, and evaluation, as well as funds for any anticipated services to
be provided as part of the incentives package (e.g. training services that are offered
alongside financial incentives). For incentives packages that might also be supported by
entities outside the government, such as donors or philanthropic institutions, coordination
between those actors to ensure secure and sufficient funding is vital (Fiedler, 2020).
As incentives can become extremely costly, statutory limits on spending for a specific
incentives programme can discourage overuse (Johnson et al., forthcoming).
In addition, the expenditure budget for all incentives and the amount of revenue
forgone for tax incentives should be made transparent and public. Doing so increases
public discussion and scrutiny of the costs of incentives (James, 2013), which can help
the government in identifying appropriate incentives policies and use, and ultimately
improve incentives-related outcomes.

39 For example, following tax expenditure calculations, the governments of Rwanda and Sierra Leone were on notice after those calculations

revealed that more than a third of revenues were given up as incentives (James, 2013).
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Implementing investment incentives
After incentives have been designed, they are ready to be implemented. This includes:
• offering the incentive (e.g. in legislation, via non-institutionalised programmes, or
otherwise);
• administering the incentive (including any required applications and approval processes,
reviewing whether potential beneficiaries meet the eligibility criteria, and ensuring the
incentive is provided to those deemed eligible);
• operating any programmatic components (e.g. operating youth mentorship programmes
or training programmes for women producers);
• addressing grievances or disputes related to incentive implementation; and
• assessing whether an incentive should be adjusted or withdrawn (either from a specific
recipient because of non-compliance with conditions, or generally in light of evaluation
and learning).
The implementation phase of incentives is extremely context-specific. Given the vast range of
incentives and investors considered under this guide, it is not possible to provide a detailed
discussion on implementation in practice. Rather, this section focuses on three key elements
of successful implementation of incentives for responsible investment in agriculture and food
systems:
• Focusing on inter-institutional coordination and collaboration
• Providing transparency and access to information
• Addressing grievances
Each element is discussed briefly.
1. Ensure strong inter-institutional coordination and collaboration
A clear allocation of responsibilities for implementing investment incentives, coupled
with strong institutional coordination and collaboration as needed, can improve efficiency
and effectiveness among the entities charged with the various stages of implementing
incentives. Processes that facilitate coordination between government entities can help
to foster information exchange, can support an appropriate allocation of capacity and
resources, and can help to address disagreements that may arise between entities.
2. Provide transparency and support access to information
Public disclosure of information in accessible formats is fundamental to ensuring investors
and other stakeholders are reliably informed in a timely manner regarding available
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incentives, as well as regarding incentives that governments have already provided.40
Access to this information allows investors to make more informed decisions and supports
public oversight of the use of public resources. Together with meaningful participation,
information disclosure contributes to credibility, legitimacy, and trust (FAO, 2014c).
i. Information on available incentives
Timely and accurate information on available incentives and their objectives should be
publicly accessible to all relevant stakeholders in an equitable and suitable manner,
using appropriate communication channels. To make information available to smallscale producers, for example, communication channels may include using rural radio
and posters; when targeting youth, television and social media may increase access
(Fiedler, 2020).41
Clearly communicating information about available incentives has multiple benefits:
• Intended beneficiaries are more likely to be aware of and access the incentives.
• If done well, information disclosure and strong communications can help to reduce
information asymmetries that would otherwise disadvantage certain intended
beneficiaries (such as more disadvantaged youth in impoverished rural areas).
• The overall investment climate is strengthened, as investors—from small-scale
producers to large enterprises—generally prefer clarity and certainty, which enables
more informed decision-making.
ii. Access to information about incentives already granted
All incentives have associated costs. Disclosing these costs, and providing information
about incentives that have been granted, can enable public scrutiny of whether
incentives are aligned with jurisdictional goals and objectives.
At a minimum, governments should disclose:
• the costs of incentives programmes, and
• the details of any specific incentives negotiated with large corporate investors.
The costs of incentives include spending on specific programmes, as well as tax
expenditures from tax incentives that reduce government revenue. Annex II discusses
this further. Disclosing these costs helps policymakers, technical staff, and the general
public better assess the effectiveness, impact, and value of the incentives.

40 Public disclosure of information is one element of transparency, which also includes access, comprehension, and use of information. For a

discussion of key elements of transparency, see Szoke-Burke, (2021).
41 CFS RAI, (2014) principle 9 stresses the need to share “information relevant to the investment, in accordance with applicable law, in an

inclusive, equitable, accessible, and transparent manner at all stages of the investment cycle.”

67

Guide on incentives for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems

Many investment contracts between large-scale investors and governments have
included negotiated investment incentives. This is not recommended: as discussed
above in Part II, if a government plans to offer any incentives to large-scale investors,
such incentives should be provided for in law. However, for those investment contracts
that do incorporate incentives, public disclosure is imperative. Governments should
disclose these contracts—along with other important information, such as associated
impact assessments, due diligence reports, and performance reports—to the general
public. This can be done by disclosing such documents online, either on a governmenthosted website or via the Open Land Contracts repository.42 Governments should also
take steps to ensure access by local communities (and their civil society partners) that
stand to be affected by the underlying investment.
3. Be prepared to address disputes or grievances
Governments should be prepared to deal with disputes or grievances raised by investors
regarding investment incentives. Such disputes might arise, for example, if the eligibility
criteria are unclear and the government and investor disagree on whether the investor
is entitled to a certain incentive, or if the government withdraws an incentive for noncompliance with conditions but the investor believes it was in compliance. While some
grievances may be inevitable, careful design can help to minimise them, as discussed
above.43
During the implementation phase, there should be a clear process and allocation of
roles and responsibilities for resolving disputes and addressing grievances. This includes
processes for addressing eligibility disputes, as well as for responding to feedback from
beneficiaries.
For incentives that have a strong programmatic component (such as programmes that
combine loans with training and mentoring services), governments should ensure there
are adequate grievance mechanisms that allow beneficiaries to raise concerns. Good
practice suggests that there should be:
• adequate information about the grievance mechanism;
• multiple ways to receive grievances (e.g. complaints box, call centre, grievance
committees, etc.);
• opportunities to raise grievances both via the programme as well as through independent
channels (such as an ombudsman); and
• sufficient and trained staff to address grievances that may be raised (Barca, 2016).
42 For instance, the governments of Liberia and Ethiopia have disclosed agricultural contracts and associated documents online. At the time

of writing, OpenLandContracts.org hosts publicly available contracts from 25 countries.
43 If governments are providing incentives to investors whose projects run a high risk of creating grievances on the part of third parties—such

as a large-scale investment that might affect nearby communities—the government should require the investor to set up a project-level
grievance mechanism. Such a mechanism should follow good practice: for example, it should be rights-compliant; ensure accessibility, safety,
and privacy; address power imbalances; and complement but not preclude access to other judicial or non-judicial mechanisms. This guide
takes the position, however, that investments with high risks of creating grievances are not good candidates for incentives.
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Monitoring, evaluation, and learning for investment incentives
Monitoring and evaluating incentives are critical for tracking and assessing their progress and
impact. Learnings based on those efforts can help governments determine whether to continue
offering certain incentives, whether to adjust any incentives proffered, and/or how to improve
future incentives. It is good practice to develop a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL)
plan at the design phase of an investment incentive.
More specifically, MEL should enable processes to assess whether incentives should be
withdrawn or adjusted at two levels:
• whether an incentive should be withdrawn from an investor that is not complying with
requisite conditions; and
• whether an incentive is moving toward achieving its intended objective given assessments
of its effectiveness and costs, and if not, whether it should be adjusted or discontinued.
While monitoring compliance with conditions should be fairly straightforward, assessing
whether incentives are able to fulfil their intended objective(s) and remain worth their costs
may be more complicated. To support such an assessment, governments can draw on the
specific indicators, selected at the planning stage of the incentive, that point to the targets
expected of each output and outcome identified. In cases where indicators to monitor progress
towards specific goals were not initially defined, or a theory of change not clearly developed,
these can be retrospectively generated for MEL purposes, based on the expectations at the
design phase, in order to track progress (IIED, 2019).
This section provides a very brief overview of MEL for incentives. Annex III provides more
details on implementing a MEL plan; policymakers and technical staff tasked with designing,
implementing, or monitoring and evaluating incentives can refer to Annex III for more specific
guidance.

Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring is the continuous collection and tracking of data regarding ongoing incentives,
which can be used to make informed decisions for policy management. Evaluation is an
objective assessment of an ongoing or completed incentive programme to determine whether
it is meeting or has met its goals.
When governments offer incentives with conditions, there should be a process for monitoring
and evaluating whether the investors who have received those incentives are complying with
the conditions. What this looks like in practice will depend on the type of incentive offered, the
condition(s) imposed, how the investor demonstrates compliance with the condition(s), and
what monitoring is feasible on the part of government.
In some cases, for example, the simplest approach may be to require that the investor certify
that it has met the (objective and quantifiable) conditions, and to monitor using “spot checks”
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and/or audits. To the extent that the government decides an investor is not in compliance,
there should be a clear process for withdrawing the incentive (and, if needed, an effective
mechanism to “claw back” the incentive already provided).
Beyond monitoring and evaluating specific investor compliance with incentive conditions,
governments should also monitor and evaluate incentives at the programme level. This can
support understanding of what works and what does not, and to probe into the reasons for
these results (IIED, 2019). For example, were the assumptions made in the theory of change
invalid, was the incentive offered inappropriate for the target population, or was the eligibility
criteria too broad (or too narrow)? This understanding, in turn, can help governments ultimately
make more informed decisions about what incentives they offer.
To do this, governments can develop a monitoring and evaluation plan linked to an incentives
programme. The goal of monitoring is the collection of data that can be used for regular
reporting, analysis, and assessment of the incentives at the evaluation phase. Broadly speaking,
monitoring can seek to focus on whether incentives have been implemented as intended and/
or whether the incentives are leading to expected results.
In developing the monitoring component of the plan, the following considerations (details of
which are included in Annex III) should be kept in mind:
• what data to collect;
• entity (or entities) responsible for monitoring data;
• data source(s) to be used;
• data collection method(s) to be used;
• disaggregated data collection;
• frequency of data collection; and
• data reporting.
Evaluation is the assessment made based on the data collected during the monitoring
phase. An effective evaluation can provide useful evidence that supports improvements or
adjustments to incentives or that provides guidance for future incentives.
Various approaches may be used in conducting an evaluation. An appropriate evaluation
approach will depend on a number of elements, including the purpose and scope of the
evaluation, the criteria to be addressed, and the type of evaluation to be conducted (IIED,
2019). Annex III provides key issues to consider when determining the evaluation approach.
Some governments may find it easiest to seek an external evaluation of certain incentives or
incentives programmes. External evaluations and recommendations can help provide insight
into the benefits and drawbacks of the government’s current approach, and can help to guide
strategic decision-making about whether to continue, adjust, or withdraw incentives.
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Applying Learnings
Together, monitoring and evaluation drive learning, which is an ongoing process throughout
the duration of each offered incentive. Learning can be used to make decisions about ongoing
incentives; in particular, whether they need to be adjusted or discontinued. It allows for and
encourages adjustments to be made to the design and implementation of an incentive in
response to the information and knowledge generated through the monitoring and evaluation
processes, as well as modifications in the design of an incentive in response to implementation
challenges incurred. For example, adjustments can be made to the eligibility criteria of tax
incentives or the conditions imposed if its redundancy ratio is greater than zero indicating a
sizable loss of potential revenue, or if its social cost becomes much higher than its benefits.
Learning can help assess whether these challenges were preventable, and how to avoid such
challenges in a similar future situation (IIED, 2019). In this way, learning can also be used in the
design of new incentives.
However, if evaluations and the learnings from them suggest that an incentive is far from
fulfilling its intended objective, is not worth its costs, and/or has become irrelevant, this might
support a decision to discontinue the incentive. To the extent that governments decide to
discontinue an incentive before the anticipated end date, they should seek to apply good
practice, such as clearly communicating the planned phase-out and, potentially, providing
parameters under which investors may continue to benefit from an incentive already granted
to them.
Learnings are, of course, only useful if relevant officials are willing to consider them, and to
adapt their approaches to incentives accordingly. Political and other factors can influence
how governments think about incentives, whether and what they will offer, and how they will
condition them. Too often, governments persist in using incentives despite evidence that they
may not be effective or worth their costs. Pressure from investors, from other states, from citizens
and other stakeholders can colour a government’s calculations about what makes sense, while
individual interests of decision-makers may also influence the shape that incentives take. It
is not uncommon for evaluations of incentives to be omitted, or for government officials to
overlook the recommendations made on the basis of evaluations and learnings.
Yet, if governments are serious about using incentives to increase and enhance responsible
investment in agriculture and food systems that supports their development priorities, it is
critical that monitoring and evaluations are undertaken, and that learnings are applied
seriously. Effective MEL can make the difference between incentives that work and those that
do not.
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Conclusion
This guide demonstrates that incentives can play a role in stimulating more responsible
investment in agriculture and food systems, although they are not always the right tool for the
job. Incentives are expensive, and should be used carefully. Incentives are not a substitute for
improving the enabling environment, which is generally much more important for small- and
large-scale investors alike.
When offering incentives, governments should prioritise incentives that support small-scale
producer households and micro- and small-scale enterprises upstream and downstream,
particularly youth and women. Supporting these investors can make a meaningful contribution
to achieving national development priorities and the goals of the CFS RAI.
Incentives should be carefully planned for, with strong participatory processes and a view
to gender and youth sensitivity in design. Through careful planning, governments can assess
whether and, if so, how incentives should be used. Where incentives are deemed an appropriate
policy response, design can be guided by clear objectives, with careful targeting, minimal
discretion, appropriate timing and timeframe, and an adequate budget. Finally, the progress
and impact of incentives should be tracked by monitoring and evaluating processes, while
learnings based on those efforts can help to assess whether incentives should be withdrawn
or adjusted.
Incentives require deliberate consideration and design if they are to be an effective mechanism
for encouraging more and better quality investment in agriculture and food systems. It is hoped
that this guide will serve as a useful tool in achieving that aim.
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Glossary
Agriculture and food systems: the range of activities required to produce, process, market,
retail, consume, and dispose of agricultural goods. This includes not only food and nonfood products, forestry, livestock and fisheries, but also the goods needed and produced
along each step of these processes. Food systems involve a wide range of stakeholders and
institutions.1
CFS RAI: (Committee on World Food Security Principles for Responsible Investment in
Agriculture and Food Systems). A voluntary international instrument developed through an
inclusive multi-stakeholder process that consists of 10 principles for achieving investments
that are responsible, contribute to food security, and promote sustainable development.
Community members: local stakeholders who own or use the land underlying or near an
investment project, or whose livelihoods and well-being may otherwise be affected by
investment activities.
Downstream activities: the processing, marketing, retail, consumption, and disposal stages of
production activities.
Enabling environment: the set of factors, conditions, and safeguards that encourage
investment generally, and responsible investment specifically.
Foreign direct investment (FDI): an investment made by an individual or private sector
enterprise from one (“home”) country into another (“host”) country.
Investment: the commitment of capital (whether financial, physical, intellectual, or other) to
something with the expectation of accumulating additional income or benefits in the future.
Investment climate: the conditions (financial, socio-political, and economic) that affect the
favourability of a given jurisdiction to investors considering it as an investment location, or
that affect the decision-making around investments more generally. Similar to the “enabling
environment.”
Investment incentive: a targeted measure provided by a government to or for the benefit
of an investor (including small-scale producers) for a new or expanded investment with the
goal of influencing the size, location, impact, behaviour, sector, or other character of such
investment. They can broadly be categorized into five groups:
• Financial incentives: non-tax-based financial supports.
• Technical and business support incentives: can include facilitation services, technological
packages, research and development, and extension services.
• Tax (fiscal) incentives: tax-based measures.
1 Adapted from the CFS RAI.
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• Regulatory incentives: derogations from national or sub-national regulations or favourable
regulatory terms offered to investors.
• Other incentives: measures that are categorised as incentives for the purpose of this guide
but do not fit into the existing established categories listed above.
In addition to these categories of incentives types, investment incentives are sometimes
described based on their underlying goal, in particular:
• Behavioural investment incentives: targeted measures provided by the government to or
for the benefit of an investor to influence investor behaviour.
• Locational investment incentives: targeted measures provided by the government to or for
the benefit of an investor to attract investment into a particular location.
Investor: for the purposes of this guide, refers to the wide range of individuals and private
sector enterprises that invest in agriculture (including livestock and pastoralism), fisheries
and aquaculture, and forestry, including investments in primary agriculture as well as those
in upstream or downstream activities. Investors include both domestic and foreign investors,
ranging from small-scale producers and micro-enterprises to large-scale corporate investors.
Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs): public agencies that focus primarily on attracting
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) into a country or sub-national region. Some IPAs may
also focus on promoting or attracting domestic investments, and/or on other related mandates
such as innovation promotion or export promotion.
Micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSME): while difficult to define across countries,
within a country, these may be defined by number of staff employed and asset base.
Responsible investment in agriculture and food systems: a responsible investment in
agriculture and food systems contributes to sustainable development, enhances food security
and nutrition, and respects human rights.
Small-scale producer: includes family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, women and youth
producing food, indigenous peoples, and post-harvest processors. While what is considered
“small-scale” is context-specific and varies across countries, scale is generally identified by
physical size (e.g. size of land being farmed) and/or economic size.
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): seventeen goals adopted unanimously in 2015 by
UN Member States as part of the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development that lay out an
integrated blue print to achieve socially inclusive, environmentally sustainable economic
growth, and to end poverty, address climate change, strengthen global institutions, and
promote peace.
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Considerations regarding how incentives can be used
Responsible agricultural and food systems investment is primarily determined by the enabling
environment, not investment incentives. Governments seeking to encourage more responsible
investment should, first and foremost, focus on improving the enabling environment. In
addition, incentives are not appropriate tools for ensuring that investment does not result in
human rights abuses or environmental harm; for that, governments must ensure that domestic
law prevents such outcomes.
In some circumstances, investment incentives may be appropriate, and may be the most
effective mechanism for overcoming a particular barrier to investment that supports the
government’s national development priorities. In such cases, incentives can be used as a
targeted policy instrument to address specific needs, but should be effective, worth their
cost, and ideally not offered to investors who would have undertaken the investment even
without the incentive.
When investment incentives are appropriate, the following recommendations can guide the
approach of policymakers and technical staff:
Process recommendations
• Seek strong coordination across relevant institutions on issues that influence investments
in agriculture and food systems, and ensure that all relevant institutions are included as
needed in incentives planning, design, and implementation.
• Create opportunities for community members, civil society, and other stakeholders to
share their perspectives and influence decision-making around investments and the
planning and design of incentives.
• Participate in regional efforts to curb redundant incentive use and to combat the “race
to the bottom.”
Substantive recommendations
• To use incentives to enhance responsible investment aligned with national development
priorities and the CFS RAI, prioritise the development of investment incentives that target
small-scale producers, especially youth and women, as well as micro- and small-scale
enterprises upstream and downstream. Avoid placing an outsized emphasis on using
incentives to attract FDI.
• Consider attaching environmental, social, health, behavioural, or other conditions to
incentives in order to achieve desired investment-related impacts that align with national
development priorities.
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• Design incentives in recognition of the different dimensions of responsible agricultural
and food systems investment, so as to not blindly pursue one dimension (e.g. food
security) at the expense of others (e.g. biodiversity).
• Consider how incentives may be packaged (including through the provision of multiple
complementary incentives together, or alongside disincentives) in order to better support
target investors’ effective use of incentives and the achievement of government’s goals.
Technical recommendations
• Reduce or eliminate the discretion to offer incentives through contracts and, when possible,
embed incentives in domestic national or sub-national law.
• Analyse proposed investment incentives for potential international trade law breaches.

Planning for, designing, monitoring, and evaluating investment incentives
for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems
Taking the above considerations and recommendations into account, this guide provides
specific information on how to plan for, design, implement, monitor, and evaluate incentives
for responsible agricultural and food systems investment.
Planning
Before any specific investment incentives are designed, careful planning can help to clarify
whether investment incentives are an appropriate intervention.
A starting point for this planning is to understand the government’s national development
priorities and how they relate to the government’s long-term goals with respect to responsible
investment in agriculture and food systems. With this understanding, the first steps in planning
for an intervention—one that might take the form of an incentive—are to identify the needs of
investors in agriculture and food systems, the barriers to responsible investment in agriculture
and food systems, the problems that the government is trying to address, and what the
government is hoping to achieve with the intervention. These steps will enable policymakers
and technical staff to ascertain whether incentives are the most appropriate mechanism and,
if so, how to design them effectively.
To support this assessment, policymakers and technical staff can conduct a context analysis,
articulate a long-term desired impact, and then use a theory of change to assess possible
interventions, in order to ultimately determine whether to use an incentive.
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Designing
When designing an investment incentive, policymakers and technical staff can aim to:
• Ensure the incentive has a clear objective that aligns with national development priorities.
• Decide on the appropriate level of targeting and use clear eligibility criteria.
• Minimise discretion in the granting of incentives.
• Select the right timing: ex ante vs. ex post.
• Establish a clear timeframe: continuity and duration.
• Understand costs and disclose expenditure budget.
Implementing
Given that the implementation phase of incentives is extremely context specific, this guide
focuses on three key elements of successful implementation.
First, there should be strong inter-institutional coordination and collaboration to support
effective implementation.
Second, governments can support access to information, which allows investors to make
more informed decisions and supports public oversight of the use of public resources. This
includes clearly communicating information about available incentives, as well as disclosing
information about incentives already granted (including their costs, and details of any specific
incentives negotiated with large corporate investors).
Third, governments should be prepared to address disputes or grievances raised by investors
regarding investment incentives. This includes having a clear process and allocation of roles
and responsibilities for resolving disputes and addressing grievances.
Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
Finally, monitoring and evaluating incentives are critical for tracking and assessing their
progress and impact. Learnings based on these efforts can help to assess whether incentives
should be withdrawn or adjusted at two levels:
• whether an incentive should be withdrawn from an investor that is not complying with
requisite conditions; and
• whether an incentive is moving toward achieving its intended objective given assessments
of its effectiveness and costs, and if not, whether it should be adjusted or discontinued.
Effective monitoring, evaluation, and learning can make the difference between incentives
that work for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems, and those that do not.
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Annex I: Theory of change
Developing a theory of change
Box 11, below, provides the basic elements to include in the development of a theory of change,
followed by an example of a theory of change narrative and its associated diagram.

BOX 11: ELEMENTS TO INCLUDE IN A THEORY OF CHANGE
A theory of change includes a number of elements, their causal relationships, and assumptions
and risks that may influence the success or failure of achieving the expected goal at each level:
Impact is the long-term desired change to be achieved for a target population reasonably
and causally attributed to the intervention. Positive impacts should be aligned with national
development priorities.
Proximate outcomes may be added, where relevant, if the desired impact cannot be measured
directly.
Outcomes are the short- and medium-term goals expected to be achieved as a result of the
completion of the outputs. They describe changes in institutional and behavioural capacities
or performance of beneficiaries due to the outputs.
Outputs describe the changes in skills or abilities and capacities of beneficiaries, or the
availability of new products and/or services that are achieved from the completion of activities
within a specified time period.
Activities define how the intervention will be carried out – the actions, processes, or strategies
that will be implemented to produce the desired outputs.
Inputs are the financial, human, technological, and information resources used to deliver
activities.
Assumptions are the necessary (internal or external) conditions that must be in place or events
that must occur for goals to be achieved at each level of the theory of change.
Risks are potential circumstances fully or partially beyond the control of the theory developed,
such as social, political, or economic factors that may affect the ability to achieve expected
goal(s) at any level of the model.
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Example of a theory of change narrative
The problem, goals, and proposed incentives
In a farming community, located in a climate change hotspot, the majority of the population is
experiencing severe food insecurity. There is a significant gap between potential agricultural
productivity and actual agricultural productivity, i.e. yield gap, which climate variability
is likely to exacerbate. After a comprehensive context analysis, aided by local farmers and
representatives from the community, a theory of change is developed. In order to close the
yield gap (strategic objective) and contribute to improving food security (desired impact), and
at the same time, avoid dangerous cropland expansion and negative environmental impacts,
it is decided that a series of training courses (incentive) be offered and implemented, targeting
local small-scale producers (target population). The training courses would focus on the
adoption of climate-smart agricultural (CSA) practices, including the use of improved crop
varieties, residue management, crop diversification, laser land leveling, and zero tillage with
residue retention. The theory of change that was developed predicts that if the majority of local
small-scale producers attend these training courses and acquire new skills and knowledge, they
will apply these skills systematically and sustainably, which in turn will improve productivity
and close the yield gap, and therefore contribute to an increase in food security.
Identifying missing steps
During the participatory process, consideration is given to missing steps in the theory of
change, from the potential intervention to the desired impact. One significant missing step is
that the beneficiaries of the incentive, equipped with the relevant CSA knowledge and skills,
must be able to purchase the related and necessary CSA technology in order to put those skills
into practice. This may include the equipment needed to achieve laser land leveling, which
enhances water use efficiency compared to unlevelled fields, and zero tillage with residue
retention, which conserves soil moisture, reducing evaporative loss of moisture, thus requiring
less water than conventionally tilled fields (Khatri-Chetri et al., 2016). Without the ability to
pay for these initial capital requirements, the farmers’ application of CSA practices may not
lead to the increased agricultural productivity that the incentive is intended to achieve. This
realization may lead to a reconceptualization of the theory of change by, for instance, adding
a crucial step at the start of the model whereby a financial incentive (through subsidies and/
or loans) is offered by public financial institutions to these farmers to help them purchase the
necessary CSA technology.
Applying a gender lens to the incentives
Consideration should also be given to any unintended consequences of the theory developed.
One such consequence that may arise from the implementation of the incentives is the danger
of leaving behind women producers, who play a critical role in the production of food crops.
To ensure that women producers benefit equally from the CSA training courses and have equal
access to financial resources required to put their newly acquired skills into practice, gendersensitive measures need to be adopted that take into account the needs of, and constraints
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faced by, women in the community. For example, the training courses may be taught by a set
proportion of female trainers who are sensitive to gender differences in agricultural practices,
crops traditionally grown by women, and illiterate farmers. In addition, the training courses
may be taught during school hours or include the provision of childcare services to ensure
the attendance of women producers. In terms of the financial support provided to farmers to
purchase the CSA technology, the existence of discriminatory practices of financial institutions
often means that women have poorer access to credit since loan agreements require collateral,
like land or asset ownership, which are usually registered in men’s names (Vorley et al., 2012).
To support women’s equal access to credit, the government may adopt policies that urge
financial institutions to implement gender-sensitive loan mechanisms and procedures or to
allocate a proportion of credit sources to women producers.
Risk analysis
In addition to the missing steps and unintended consequences, the assumptions made and any
associated risks that they may carry are examined. In a case where an assumption is seen to
represent a more substantial risk, policymakers and technical staff may adjust the intervention,
re-design the incentives, develop a contingency plan, or establish a risk management plan to
monitor and address conditions as needed (Roberts and Khattri , 2012). If, for instance, the
jurisdiction is located in an area prone to frequent floods or drought, the training courses could
include strengthening capacities of key stakeholders to mitigate and respond to disasters,
environmental challenges, and climate crises (FAO, 2019a). See Figure 3.
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Impacts

Figure 3 - Theory of change visual
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Using the theory of change developed to inform MEL
The theory of change developed at the planning stage established the logic hierarchy (from
inputs to impact) that an incentive is hypothesised to follow. Policymakers and technical staff
designing an incentive should establish complementary detail to the logic developed to help
track progress towards achieving the desired impact. The details, discussed below, will form
the basis of the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) stage of an incentive.
A first step is to work out the indicators and targets associated with each of the expected
results anticipated in the theory of change. Indicators are quantitative or qualitative measures
that enable one to assess the degree to which activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts have
been achieved. Indicators define in measurable terms the performance required at each level
of the theory of change in order to reach the next desired level. For instance, using the theory
of change example above, several outcome indicators may be selected to measure the change
in agricultural productivity over time, including measures of soil health, crop diversity, and/
or seed quality used. On the other hand, a single indicator may be sufficient to measure an
expected result, like the number of small-scale producers that attend the training sessions (an
output indicator).
Targets are the desired level of performance, or magnitude of change, expected at a specific
point in time for each indicator (IIED, 2019). In other words, targeting is the act of putting
numbers and dates on indicators.44 An outcome target using the example above could be:
by 2025, emission intensity, in particular from agricultural activities, will be reduced by 50
percent. Targets can be quantitative or qualitative, depending on the indicator, and should
satisfy the SMART criterion (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, timely) to have the
greatest potential for achieving the expected results at each level of the theory of change.
In order to understand the rate of change over time of an indicator and the likelihood that a
target will be met, benchmarks can be established. Benchmarks are the expected levels of
achievement of an indicator at specified points in an incentive cycle. When such benchmarks
are not met, policymakers and technical staff may wish to adjust the design or implementation
of an incentive, the indicators and/or targets selected, or decide to withdraw or discontinue an
incentive altogether.
Finally, baseline data should be set for each indicator. Baseline data is the status of the
indicator at the start of a project or incentive and serves as the reference point for comparison,
i.e. to measure progress or achievements against the situation that prevailed before the
implementation of an incentive. This data may be collected during the planning stage of the
incentive as part of the context analysis.

44 CFS RAI Principle 10 recognises the need to “defin[e] baseline data and indicators for monitoring and to measure impacts.” In addition, “[s]

tates are encouraged, in consultation with all relevant stakeholders, especially the most vulnerable, and as appropriate with national human
rights institutions, to establish monitoring, assessment, and reporting systems ...” See: FAO, (2016), 23.
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It is important to address and integrate issues and differences relating to gender and age into
these elements in order for disaggregated data to be collected and reported for all expected
results. This is especially critical when differentiated gender impacts might occur and be
relevant. Other demographic data, where relevant, should also be disaggregated to understand
the different way targeted groups benefit (or not) from the incentives offered.
If resources—such as time, money, knowledge, and/ or skills—are limited, focus on a small
core set of critical results, and then develop indicators for which data collection is realistic:
available in a timely way and neither too burdensome nor too costly. It is also wise to establish:
• how the data for the indicators and targets will be tracked and analysed;
• how often the measurements will occur;
• the source of data;
• who will be responsible for the data collection;
• how the data will be collected;
• whether the data will be checked for quality; and
• the financial resources to be used (IIED, 2019).
Clarifying these elements at the planning stage and in conjunction with the theory of change
can greatly facilitate the MEL stage. Policymakers and technical staff can gradually strengthen
these tools as the incentives are implemented and monitored.
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As noted in Part II of the guide, evidence suggests that tax incentives, as they are generally used,
may not be worth their costs or even effective. Some of this research is highlighted below in Box 12.
In light of this evidence, policymakers and technical staff should carefully consider whether it is
necessary to offer tax incentives in the agricultural and food systems context. In many cases, it may
not be. In the event that they are still offered, effective and efficient use of tax incentives requires
that they be carefully designed, with a view to improving their transparency and governance,
and systematically monitored and evaluated to facilitate informed decision-making (IMF et al.,
2015). This Annex provides guiding principles relevant to the design of tax incentives.

BOX 12: DOUBTS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VALUE OF TAX INCENTIVES
Investment incentives and their impacts are difficult to quantify, yet researchers have sought
to measure the impact of various tax incentives through both econometric and qualitative
studies. When assessing incentive impacts, one primary question is effectiveness– i.e., do they
induce the desired investment or behavioural change. Even if some level of effectiveness is
proven, another question is whether incentives “are worth the costs and trade-offs they imply,”
as they may reduce governments’ ability to spend on important public goods and services
(Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016).
Econometric Studies
Econometric studies have drawn varied conclusions regarding tax incentives. For example, an
analysis by a World Bank economist (James, 2013) found that econometric studies of investment
incentives (not specifically focused on agriculture and food systems) showed the following results:
• “Investments are not strongly influenced by lower tax rates in countries with weak
investment climate.” James, (2013).
• “Investments in developed countries respond strongly to incentives.” de Mooij and
Enderveen, (2003), Desai, Foley, and Hines, (2004).
• “Investments have responded to incentives in some developing countries, but the elasticity
was smaller than [in] developed countries.” Klemm and Van Parys, (2009).
• “Export-oriented investments—especially mobile ones—are more sensitive to tax
incentives.”45 Grubert and Mutti, (2004), Rolfe and White, (1992), Wells, (1986).
• “Investment incentives create significant distortions by encouraging inefficient
investments.” Hassett and Hubbard, (2002).
45 One downside of this effectiveness vis-a-vis mobile firms is that such firms may be more likely move to other jurisdictions when offered

more attractive incentives there. This can limit the benefits to the original jurisdiction, and also exacerbate a “race to the bottom” in offering
incentives.
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• “Low inflation is the best investment incentive.” Hassett and Hubbard, (2002).
• “Temporary incentives have bigger short-run impact than permanent ones.” Hassett and
Hubbard, (2002).
To add to those conclusions:
• Increased FDI flows do not necessarily increase total investment as they can displace local
investment. Klemm and Van Parys, (2012).
• Even in the context of export-oriented investments, the ultimate impact on a country’s
economic output can be limited in spite of all FDI incentives offered. FAO, (2013a).
Interview-Based Studies
Qualitative studies based on firm-level information have helped to shed light on investment
decision-making and the effect of tax incentives. The same World Bank study that reviewed
econometric studies also reviewed qualitative studies available at the time, finding that studies
show that redundancy levels (whereby incentives are provided even though investors would
have invested without the incentives) “are quite high for investors in almost all the countries,”
with the main exception being exporters, for whom “tax incentives are far more important.” The
review also found that investment incentives “did not affect the level of investment for most
investors” (James, 2013). In particular, the review of qualitative studies showed that tax incentives
are “particularly redundant for investments oriented toward domestic markets and those based
on natural resources … unique to a country” (James, 2013), which arguably can include certain
large-scale agricultural plantations such as rubber and bananas (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016).
These conclusions align with the research results of other international institutions. According
to the IMF, investment surveys reveal that “tax incentives usually do not top the list of investment
factors in developing countries.” In addition, the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization 2010 business survey of 7,000 companies in 19 sub-Saharan African countries
ranked incentives packages 11th out of 12 location factors, with this importance falling over time.
By contrast, transparency of the legal framework ranked much higher and grew in importance,
leading to the conclusion that investors “seem to care much more about deficient legislation
and onerous regulations than about the availability of tax incentives” (IMF et al., 2015).
Two agriculture-specific, interview-based studies that reach similar conclusions—finding
that tax incentives have not stimulated agricultural/agribusiness investments in Ethiopia and
Ghana—are discussed above in Part II.
Profit- versus cost-based tax incentives
To the extent that tax incentives are worth using, research has shown that cost-based tax
incentives may have a greater chance of stimulating investment. By lowering the cost of
capital, cost-based incentives “make a greater number of investment projects more profitable
at the margin—that is, may generate investments that would not otherwise have been made.”
By contrast, the effect of profit-based tax incentives may be to “forego government revenue in
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order to make even more profitable investment projects that would be profitable, and hence
undertaken, even without the incentive” (IMF et al., 2015). This is especially the case where
there exist location-specific factors, including “natural resources, agglomerations, or local
markets” (IMF et al., 2015; Mansour, 2019). However, as with any incentive, each particular
type of tax incentive requires close examination in the context in which it would be offered to
understand potential efficacy and to assess whether it is worth the costs.

To the extent that tax incentives will be offered, governments are encouraged to adhere to
the guiding principles enumerated below, in conjunction with the more general principles
in this guide. Many of the below principles are adopted directly from the OECD’s Principles
to Enhance Transparency and Governance of Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing
Countries (OECD, 2013).
1. Tax incentives should aim to contribute to a country’s development goals, which should be
aligned with the CFS RAI principles
If governments decide to offer tax incentives for investment in agriculture and food
systems, such incentives should be used narrowly to address specific market failures or
obstacles to responsible investment. More generally, they should contribute to a country’s
national development priorities, which should be aligned with the CFS RAI. As such, the
benefits they generate should support sustainable development goals, and should also
exceed their associated costs.
To try to understand whether the tax incentives’ quantifiable benefits would outweigh the
associated costs, governments can use a financial model, i.e. a cost benefit analysis (CBA).
A well-designed CBA can help mitigate several potential problems associated with tax
(and other) incentives:
• by quantifying expected costs, a jurisdiction can avoid overcommitting its resources to
investors;
• the process of comparing costs with benefits over time gives the jurisdiction the
opportunity to understand more specifically whether and how an investment is likely to
improve or enhance sustainable development in that jurisdiction;
• the CBA can be used to build support for high-quality, responsible investments and to
steer the jurisdiction’s interest away from lower-quality opportunities; and
• the expectations set as a result of the CBA can be used after the fact to monitor and
evaluate the actual outcomes of the investments made under the incentive to determine
whether net benefits were achieved (Harpel, 2016).
Despite these benefits, there are limits to what governments can accomplish with CBAs.
Some governments do not have the technical tools to develop and run sophisticated
models. Others do not have sufficient and adequate data. Even if the tools and the data
are available, the analysis may be subpar: incorrect assumptions, incorrect use of the tools
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or application of the data, or similar factors may limit its usefulness (UN and CIAT, 2018).
Finally, CBA’s focus on quantifiable elements may obscure some of the likely impacts,
benefits, and costs of incentives, despite their relevance for sustainable development goals.
Nevertheless, it is important for governments planning to offer new tax incentives (as well
as for those that are evaluating existing incentives) to seek to estimate the costs and the
benefits of the intended or ongoing incentives. While specific guidance on how to conduct
a good CBA is beyond the scope of this guide, additional guidance on the topic, including a
prototype model, is available in a recent UN document on “Design and Assessment of Tax
Incentives in Developing Countries” (UN and CIAT, 2018).
2. Publicly disclose all tax incentives for investment in agriculture and food systems—as well
as their objectives—within a governing framework
A tax incentive should be granted only when its objective aligns with the development
strategy of the jurisdiction. Governments should make explicit the policy objectives of the
incentives; the justification for the use of each incentive (e.g. employment creation, R&D,
technology transfer); and the expected costs and intended benefits of the incentives. This
information should be made in a public statement that is regularly updated. The statement
allows for the government to be held accountable for the incentives, as well as provide
the basis for assessing the performance of the incentives, and identifying any overlap,
duplication or inconsistency with other programmes.
3. Tax incentives should be prescribed in the law and ratified through the law-making body
Tax incentives, including their eligibility criteria, should be consolidated under the tax law.
This reduces the likelihood of conflicting or overlapping provisions, increases transparency,
and empowers the tax administration to administer them effectively with due respect to
the public interest. It also ensures that the incentives have been subject to the legislative
process, having passed appropriate parliamentary and public scrutiny (OECD, 2015). If
provided, tax incentives should be simple to both apply for and to administer.
4. The authority to enact tax incentives should be with the Ministry of Finance
Tax incentives should be enacted and consolidated under the authority of the Ministry
of Finance. By consolidating them under a single body, inconsistencies in policies can be
avoided, transparency can be increased, and discretionary power can be limited. Where tax
incentives are administered and enforced by a different agency (e.g. tax administration) or
different levels of government, these entities should coordinate so that the efficiency and
transparency of their efforts is maximised.
5. Process for applying for tax incentives should be based on clearly defined and objective
eligibility criteria
Once enacted in the relevant tax laws and accompanying regulations, tax incentives
should be provided to any investors who meet the eligibility criteria prescribed under
the law, without the need to negotiate with the granting authority (IMF et al., 2015). This
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helps promote transparency and accountability, and encourages investor certainty, so
long as the eligibility criteria is clearly defined and objective (Johnson et al. forthcoming).
Granting incentives in this way can then be largely automatic once the taxpayer satisfies
the stipulated conditions of the criterion.
The eligibility criteria should include minimum conditions to be met in order to be
eligible for the tax incentive. These include basic steps an investor must take (such as the
requirement to file a tax return, or to provide a statement detailing the duty or exemptions
availed in the prescribed period) (OECD, 2013), as well as criteria used to target investors
and investments that meet certain conditions inherent to the investment that the
government is seeking to attract (such as the size of the project or investment made, type
of activity conducted, home state of the investor, or location of the investment) (TavaresLehmann et al., 2016). Given the potential of SMEs and small-scale producers to contribute
to sustainable development and inclusive economic growth, and considering the risk of
crowding out their investments, it may be preferable in many cases to avoid imposing
conditions based on the size of the project.
In addition, eligibility criteria can hinge on requirements that investors behave in ways
that the host country considers particularly conducive to responsible investment. These
types of conditions may target, for example, investors that: comply with environmental
or labour standards that are above and beyond those required by the law; exclusively use
climate-smart technology and practice; generate a certain number of permanent, wellcompensated jobs; or integrate an inclusive business model that sources produce from
small-scale producers or involves them as shareholders in a joint venture. Providing tax
incentives upon proof that such conditions have been met allows jurisdictions to target
investors that invest responsibly, with the aim of achieving sustainable development goals.
6. Cost-based vs. profit-based tax incentives
When tax incentives are offered, cost-based tax incentives are more likely to serve
government goals than profit-based ones. A profit-based incentive lowers the tax rate for
any amount of profit earned by an investor. Thus, the value of the incentive is a direct
function of the company’s profits, which results in the incentive favouring firms with high
profits and therefore least in need of an incentive to invest (Andersen et al., 2017). A profitbased incentive is also more likely to be redundant. A cost-based incentive is independent
of the profit level of a company and instead focuses on lowering the cost of capital, which
increases the chances that project is profitable; cost-based incentives thus are more likely
to stimulate investment that would not have occurred without such incentives. Cost-based
incentives are also encouraged because tax revenue loss is more predictable, and they are
less likely to be abused (Andersen et al., 2017).
7. Ensure that certain safeguards are included to minimise the potential for abuse
There are multiple ways that investors have sought to abuse tax incentives, in particular by
engaging in various practices that make them appear eligible to receive incentives even
though they should be excluded from eligibility. These practices include, for example,
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transforming into new entities (when the incentive is not available for existing firms),
“roundtripping” or restructuring as foreign entities (when the incentive is not available to
domestic firms), and engaging in transfer pricing or similar practices that seek to inaccurately
allocate profit to a tax exempt/privileged entity or activity (UN and CIAT, 2018).
Understanding the likely ways in which specific tax incentives can be abused can help
governments both in selecting the appropriate incentives that are least likely to be abused, as
well as in including safeguards, when possible, to minimise such abuse (UN and CIAT, 2018).
8. Ensure tax incentives are time-bound
The legislation that provides tax incentives should have a built-in sunset provision, which
means that the legislation will expire at a certain time, unless proactively renewed by the
legislature. By doing so, the government can seek to ensure that investment incentives
neither outlive their usefulness nor become a line-item that is difficult to repeal because
of entrenched interests.
9. Monitor and evaluate performance, relevance and compliance
Tax incentives are not always effective at meeting the government’s goals: they may
have been designed poorly at the outset, or they may simply outlast their usefulness as
economies evolve and a country’s needs and goals change. While sunset provisions provide
one mechanism for ending inefficient or redundant incentives, there is also a need to build
in mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of ongoing incentives.
The monitoring and evaluation of tax incentives should consider, for example, whether they
are incentivising new investment, whether it is helping to meet the stated development
goal(s), whether it continues to be relevant, and whether investors have complied with
the conditions tied to the incentive. The results of such periodic reviews should inform
decision-making on the continuation or withdrawal of the tax incentive. The review criteria
and results should also be reported publicly.
Separately, tax authorities should also periodically carry out audits of investments where
tax incentives have been granted to ensure that they are not misused, e.g. tax avoidance
or evasion, and impose penalties if misuse occurred.
10. Collect data systematically to support the statement of tax expenditures and to monitor
individual tax incentives
While the periodic analysis of tax incentives is data- and resource- intensive, such analysis
is necessary for providing transparent public statements, budgeting, calculating amount
of revenue forgone, and tracking of behavioural responses by businesses. The analysis
should include a record of the beneficiaries of tax incentives, their duration, individual
taxpayer data, behavioural responses both good (e.g. employing local youth) and bad
(e.g. aggressive tax planning), and the costs in forgone revenue. This kind of analysis may
require the introduction of new mechanisms and tools in some countries, and sufficient
funds should be allocated to ensure that adequate analyses can be done.
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Monitoring
Monitoring is the routine and continuous collection and tracking of data to provide the relevant
government agency, the management team, and key stakeholders of an ongoing incentive
with indications of the extent of progress (or lack of) and achievement of expected results,
and progress in the use of allocated funds. The goal of monitoring should be the collection
of data, stored in an information system, that can be used for regular reporting, analysis, and
assessment of the incentive at the evaluation phase.
Broadly speaking, monitoring can focus on an assessment of the expected results at the
outcome and impact levels, or whether incentives have been implemented as intended and
are leading to expected outputs. The following considerations should be kept in mind when
developing a monitoring plan.
1. What data to collect
A fundamental first step is deciding what data needs to be collected. Data collection is the
process of systematically gathering quantitative and/or qualitative data for the purposes of
monitoring, evaluating, and learning. The indicators from the theory of change developed
at the planning stage can be used for this purpose, or it may be necessary to develop
sub-indicators that feed into the existing ones (IIED, 2019). The data collected for each
indicator are monitored against baselines, on the one hand, and targets, on the other, at
each stage of the theory of change developed. Baseline data, which is the situation before
the incentive is implemented, must also be collected before the implementation of the
incentive to measure change toward targets. Without the baseline data, it is difficult to
measure the progress made as a result of an incentive.
Consideration should be given to the time, effort, and resources required for data collection
(University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture n.d.). Government ministries and agencies
should be encouraged to share data among relevant sectors and key stakeholders for the
promotion of widespread learning and transfer of knowledge (IIED, 2019).
2. Entity responsible for monitoring data
Identify the entity or entities responsible for collecting, analysing, reporting, and
communicating the data (IIED, 2019). Including key stakeholders beyond government
authorities (e.g. beneficiaries of the incentives, and/or farming cooperatives and
organisations) can strengthen monitoring efforts, as well as subsequent evaluation and
learning efforts.
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3. Identify the source of data
The source of data that will be used for each indicator must also be identified. Data can be
collected through an existing source (secondary data) or a new one (primary data). There
are advantages and disadvantages to both. Secondary data sources include any relevant
data already collected, government agencies and authorities, and/or academia. These
sources can provide relevant information for MEL purposes, such as official statistics,
national account data, national household surveys, or on external factors that may affect
the implementation and progress of the incentives (USAID, 2019). Primary data sources
are collected specifically for the purposes of the incentive (and therefore are more costly),
such as recording the number of beneficiaries attending a training course (output data); or
recording the proportion of small-scale farmers’ use of sustainable practices during site
visits (outcome data).
4. Identify the data collection method to be used
The monitoring plan should also include the data collection method for each indicator, i.e.
the procedure for how data are collected. This method can be quantitative or qualitative.
When selecting a method for data collection, a number of factors need to be kept in mind,
including the cost of the method chosen, the appropriateness of the method given local
context and traditions, and the level of rigour necessary (USAID 2019). In addition, it may
be necessary to adapt the data collection method for a particular indicator in the face of
unforeseen challenges (IIED, 2019).
Some commonly used quantitative methods include:
• recording data through administrative actions, e.g. recording the number of farmers
who purchased specified technology using the subsidies provided;
• electronic data collection, e.g. beneficiaries record actions into a mobile app;
• surveys, e.g. questions asked of beneficiaries regarding their knowledge after
completion of the training courses; and
• observations, e.g. trained observer recording total farmland coverage using new
practices in a given jurisdiction (USAID, 2019).
Some commonly used qualitative methods include:
• interviews, e.g. an interviewer asks a beneficiary about her knowledge, experience
and perception of certain practices;
• focus group discussions, e.g. moderator leads a discussion among a group on their
perception about the sustainability of certain practices; and
• observations, e.g. trained observer attends training course to make observations
informed by her interactions with beneficiaries during the activity (USAID, 2019).
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5. Use of disaggregated data
Data should be disaggregated for each indicator, where necessary, by demographics that
will inform the decision-making process regarding the breadth of reach at each stage
of the incentive. For example, if incentives are targeting youth farmers, it is important
to monitor how the incentives are affecting farmers of different age categories; if the
incentives are geared toward empowering small-scale farmers, it is critical to monitor
how the incentives may be impacting women and men differently. Disaggregated data can
improve understanding of the progress made toward the expected results by providing
details of the experiences of a subset of the beneficiaries monitored by that indicator.
Without such data, it is not possible to assess whether the incentives have been effective at
benefiting the target beneficiaries, or to identify any potential unintended consequences
on other groups (FAO, 2018a).
6. Frequency of data collection
The frequency of data collection for each indicator will need to be considered. This will
depend on the specific indicator being measured. Monitoring an output indicator, like
attendance at a training course, will be a one-time recording of the number of attendees.
However, monitoring an impact indicator, like a change in farmers’ income after the
introduction of improved seed to increase productivity, might need to be collected
annually, at the end of the farming season, and only after allowing time for its distribution,
adoption, and improved yield. The frequency of data collection will also depend on the
method being used. For instance, in-person observations or in-depth interviews by trained
personnel are more resource- and time- intensive and therefore may occur once at the
end of an incentive cycle, whereas electronic collection of data by beneficiaries could
occur on a weekly basis (USAID, 2019).
7. Data reporting
The regular reporting of data can help track the success (or failure) of incentives as it will
feed into the analysis of the data at the evaluation phase. It will also help generate and
share lessons learned across government levels and agencies. Without this final step, the
resources devoted to data collection will largely be wasted.

Evaluation
Evaluation is the systematic and critical assessment of an ongoing or completed project,
programme or policy, its design, implementation and/or results. It uses data collected through
monitoring, as a starting point, to provide information about what works, what does not, and
probes into the reasons for these results (IIED, 2019).
There are many reasons why an evaluation may be conducted: to determine the efficiency of
an incentive; to examine whether an incentive has fulfilled its intended objective(s); or to assess
the sustainability of an incentive. An effective evaluation should also provide useful evidence
to contribute to learning processes that can be used to improve an incentive or to provide
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guidance for future interventions, and to strengthen accountability for development results.
The following provides the main principles to consider when determining the evaluation
approach to MEL, i.e. the methodology used to conduct an evaluation. It largely follows the
approach adopted by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED),
(2019), which has been adapted for the purposes of this guide.
1. The scope and purpose of the evaluation
An evaluation uses the monitoring data generated to track the expected results of an
intervention, like an incentive, or project. To perform a meaningful evaluation, the
purpose of the evaluation has to be clearly defined, e.g. to assess performance, to support
improvement, for accountability purposes, or for knowledge building, etc. (Better Evaluation
n.d.). The scope of the evaluation provides more detail (e.g. timeframe, necessary resources,
etc.) and clarifies what will and will not be included.
2. Entity to conduct the evaluation
Who should conduct the evaluation depends on multiple factors, including the objective
of the evaluation, how complex it will be, and the level of independence required.
Depending on these factors, either internal evaluators or external evaluators may be more
appropriate.
Internal evaluators may undertake, for example, a context analysis in a jurisdiction during
the development of an intervention; a process evaluation to better understand how an
incentive is operating on the ground; or a cost-benefit analysis to assess the revenue
forgone of a tax incentive. While the use of internal evaluators is cost-effective, external
evaluators have the advantage of being viewed as more impartial and independent.
“Impartiality contributes to the credibility of evaluation and the avoidance of bias in
findings, analyses and conclusions” (OECD DAC, 2010). For instance, external evaluators
may be best positioned to conduct an impact evaluation at the end of an incentive cycle.
3. Develop key evaluation questions with relevant stakeholders
Key evaluation questions should be formulated early in the process to help clarify the
specific objectives of the evaluation, and to inform the development of the methodology.
Relevant stakeholders, whose interests or rights are (directly or indirectly) connected to
the specific purpose of the evaluation, can be involved early on in the process and given
the opportunity to identify issues to be addressed and evaluation questions to be answered
(OECD DAC, 2010).
Some evaluation questions may require additional data to provide insight that can aid in
learning new lessons about a situation. For example, while monitoring data may provide
evidence of the number of women producers that have actively engaged in climate-smart
agricultural practices supported through a training course, policymakers and technical staff
may be interested to know what key factors led to this level of engagement, e.g. was it the
training courses coupled with the grants provided to purchase the specified technology;
was it the increase in work time afforded to women because of accessible childcare services
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provided; was it the change in the land tenure system that allowed women to receive
bigger grants to invest in agriculture; etc. This information can impact future allocation of
resources to achieve more transformational or cost-effective outcomes (IIED, 2019).
1. Identify the appropriate evaluation criteria
Once the evaluation questions have been formulated, consideration should be given
to the evaluation criteria to use as the basis of the assessment (IIED, 2019). The OECD
Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) evaluation criteria, revised and published
in December 2019, provides one of the most commonly used sets of evaluation criteria,
known as the DAC criteria (see Box 13). The application of these criteria—or any additional
ones—depends on the evaluation questions and the objectives of the evaluation.

BOX 13: DAC EVALUATION CRITERIA
Relevance: The extent to which an incentive’s objectives and design respond to the
intended beneficiaries’ or jurisdiction’s needs, the region’s, country’s or global priorities,
and/or the priorities and policies of development partners and donors, and continue to
do so if circumstances change. A relevant incentive will clearly demonstrate the theory of
change logic developed and any causal relationships identified (IIED, 2019).
Coherence: The extent of the compatibility of the incentive with other interventions in a
country, sector or institution. A lack of coherence can lead to duplication or cancellation
of efforts, which can undermine overall progress.
Effectiveness: The extent to which the incentive achieved, or is expected to achieve, its
objectives and results. It can also be used as an aggregate measure of (or judgment about)
the merit or worth of an activity, i.e. the extent to which an incentive has attained, or is
expected to attain, its strategic objective(s) efficiently, in a sustainable fashion, and with
positive institutional development impact.
Efficiency: The extent to which the incentive delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an
economic and timely way. “Economic” is the conversion of inputs into outputs, outcomes
and impacts, in the most cost-effective way possible. The goal is to achieve the desired
results at each level in the least costly way possible. “Timely” delivery means delivery of
results within the intended timeframe, or a timeframe reasonably adjusted to the demands
of the evolving context.
Impact: The extent to which the incentive has generated, or is expected to generate, significant
positive or negative, intended or unintended, higher-level effects. Impact addresses the
ultimate significance and potentially transformative effects of the incentive. It seeks to
identify the social, environmental and economic effects of the incentive that are longerterm or broader in scope than those already captured under the effectiveness criterion.
Sustainability: The extent to which the net benefits of the incentive continue, or are likely to
continue, after the incentive cycle. This includes an examination of the financial, economic,
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social, environmental, and institutional capacities of the systems needed to sustain net
benefits over time. It involves analyses of resilience, risks and potential trade-offs.
Adapted from source: OECD DAC (2019) and OECD DAC (2010).

2. Evaluation types
There are several types of evaluations that can be conducted, depending largely on the evaluation
purpose, objective, and questions. Table 7 includes several common evaluation types.
Table 7 – Common Evaluation Types
Evaluation Types

When to use

Formative Evaluation

During the development of a new
incentive.

Evaluability
Assessment
Needs Assessment
Context Analysis

Process Evaluation
Monitoring of
Incentive

When an existing incentive is
being modified or is being used in
a new setting or with a new
population.

What it shows
Whether the proposed
incentive is likely to be
needed, understood and
accepted by the population
you want to reach.

How well the incentive is
working.

Provides an early warning for
any problems that may occur.

During operation of an existing
incentive.

The extent to which the
incentive is being
implemented as designed.

Allows implementing team to
monitor how well the
incentive plans and activities
are working.

Objectives-Based
Evaluation
Economic Evaluation:

At the beginning of an incentive.

Cost-Effectiveness
Evaluation,

During the operation of an
existing incentive.

What resources are being used
for an incentive and their costs
(direct and indirect) compared
to outcomes.

Cost-Utility Analysis

Impact Evaluation

Maximises the likelihood that
the incentive will succeed.

As soon as incentive
implementation begins.

The degree to which the
After the incentive has made
contact with at least one person or incentive is having
group in the target population.
an effect on the target
population's behaviours.

Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis,

It allows for modifications to
be made to the plan before
full implementation begins.

The extent to which an
evaluation is possible, based
on the goals and objectives.

Whether the incentive is
accessible and acceptable to
its target population.
Outcome Evaluation

Why it is useful

During the operation of an existing The degree to which the
incentive at appropriate intervals. incentive meets its ultimate
goal (desired impact).
At the end of an incentive.

Tells whether the incentive is
being effective in meeting
objectives.

Provides relevant government
agency and managers a way to
assess cost relative to effects.
“How much bang for your
buck.”

Provides evidence for use in
policy and funding decisions.

Adapted from source: National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (n.d.).

95

Guide on incentives for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems

Learning
To maximise the utility of lessons learned, the information and knowledge generated through
the monitoring and evaluation processes should be analysed to identify any challenges
faced, how those challenges were overcome, and whether in hindsight those challenges
were preventable. The lessons learned about the way(s) to avoid such challenges in a similar
future situation is important in the learning process (IIED, 2019). Sharing lessons learned is
also important, and mechanisms should be developed for disseminating the information to
relevant stakeholders and beyond.
When learning is effectively incorporated into a MEL plan, such learning can help
policymakers and technical staff inform, adjust, and improve current and future incentive
design and implementation, and/or withdraw or discontinue an incentive. This cycle of
monitoring, evaluating, and learning by adjusting and improving incentives is centred on an
iterative process of making decisions based on that learning (Williams and Brown, 2014). It
allows for and encourages adjustments to be made in response to changing circumstances,
including politics, law, environment, socioeconomics, and so on; new information surfaced;
or when targets and indicators are not performing as expected or if they become irrelevant
(IIED, 2019).
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